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"[Miany allegations might be 'strange, but true; for truth
1
is always strange, Stranger than fiction."'

O----0
Scenario 1: A litigant files in federal district court a
"petition for writ of habeas corpus extraterrestrial,"
which seeks the release of extraterrestrial beings allegedly held by federal authorities after the crash of their
space craft.
Question: Should such a petition be dismissed as delusional or wholly incredible, i.e., factually frivolous?

O---- 0

*Supervisory Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policies
of the Second Circuit.
1. Denton v. Hemandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (quoting LORD BYRON, DON
JUAN, canto XIV, stanza 101 (T. Steffan et al. eds. 1977)).
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The processing of frivolous and other clearly meritless actions has
long been a taxing, and sometimes surreal, experience for the federal
courts. The courts must balance the requirements of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses and the right of access to the courts2 with the
need of the judiciary to efficiently manage its docket. In an effort to
strike the correct balance, both Congress and the courts have developed a
variety of mechanisms to weed out clearly meritless actions as fairly and
expeditiously as possible. A major step in this regard was the enactment,
in 1996, of the Prison Litigation Reform Act3 (PLRA), which significantly altered the processing of informapauperisand prisoner litigation.
This article will review the mechanisms employed by the federal trial
and appellate courts to sua sponte screen their dockets and dispose of
meritless actions. The primary focus will be on the screening and dismissal procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and
42 U.S.C. § 1997e, all of which were significantly amended, or created,
by the PLRA. The article will also discuss the special problems posed by
"delusional" or "wholly incredible" allegations and will propose guidelines for the processing of cases involving such allegations.

2. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (access
to courts is a constitutional right); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (same); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1988)
(same); Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
3. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, § 804(a), (c)-(e),
110 Stat. 1321-73, 1321-74, 1321-75 (enacted April 26, 1996).
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AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO

DIsMiss CLEARLY MERITLESS ACTIONS AND APPEALS

A. Overview of the Dismissal
Provisionsof 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e
Prior to the 1996 amendments to § 1915, actions filed informa pauperis pursuant to § 1915(a) (i.e., without prepayment of fees due to the
indigence of the litigant), could be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(d) "if
the allegation of poverty [was] untrue, or if [the court was] satisfied that
the action [was] frivolous or malicious. '4 The 1996 PLRA amendments
to § 1915, among other things, established a filing fee regimen for prisoners and moved the dismissal provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 5 This provision now provides as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any partial portion thereof,
that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B)

the action or appeal(i)
(ii)
be granted; or

is frivolous or malicious;
fails to state a claim on which relief may

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), as it existed prior to the 1996 PLRA amendments, stated
as follows: "The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to

employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994).
5. See § 804(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 1321-73. To minimize any confusion that may
result from the PLRA's redesignation of the dismissal portion of pre-PLRA § 1915(d) to
the current § 1915(e)(2), the current designation will be used except where reference to
the superseded version is necessary.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (Supp. III 1998).
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(iii)
seeks monetary relief
against a defen6
dant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, an entirely new provision created by the PLRA, states, in pertinent part:
(a)

Screening.--The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a
complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.

(b)

Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary7 relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), also created by the PLRA, provides as follows:
(c)

Dismissal
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a
party dismiss any action brought in respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

7.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Supp. HI 1998).
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seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief, the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.8
All three statutes use virtually identical language to identify the ac-

tions which must be dismissed: those that are frivolous, malicious, or fail
to state a claim, and those that seek damages from defendants who are

immune from such relief. No statutory definitions exist for these identifying terms, and the PLRA's legislative history is silent on this precise

point. However, under the canon of statutory construction that presumes
that identical terms within an act bear the same meaning, 9 it is concluded
that Congress intended that these identifying words bear the same
meaning in all three statutes. 10
Similarly, it is concluded that the phrase, "fails to state a claim upon

[or 'on'] which relief may be granted," in all three PLRA dismissal provisions has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). n The PLRA amendments clearly evi8. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. 1111998).
9. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 460 (1993) ("Presumptively, 'identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning.' ") (quoting Commissioner v. Keystone Consol.
Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
479 (1992); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Sorenson v. Secretary of
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S.
84, 87 (1934); see also cases cited infra note 12.
10. This article will not discuss the dismissal of malicious actions, authorized by
all three PLRA dismissal provisions, or actions in which untrue affidavits of poverty are
filed, authorized by § 1915(e)(2). Such dismissals are negligible in number when compared to the other grounds for dismissal listed in the three PLRA dismissal provisions.
11. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states as follows:

(b) ... Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
12. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7524, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole) ("If enacted, all of these provisions would go a long way to curtail frivolous
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dence Congress's wish to aid the judiciary in its struggle to efficiently
process certain types of actions. 12 Rather than create entirely new tools,

Congress simply took a standard defense and mandated its application at
an earlier point in those actions. Thus, every circuit court in interpreting
dismissal
the phrase "fails to state a claim" in any of the three PLRA
13
provisions has properly looked to Rule 12(b)(6) for guidance.
prisoner litigation."); id. at S7526 (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("This bill will deter frivolous
inmate lawsuits.... Legislation is needed because of the large and growing number of
prisoner civil rights complaints, the burden that disposing of meritless complaints imposes on efficient judicial administration, and the need to discourage prisoners from filing frivolous complaints as a means of gaining a 'short sabbatical in the nearest Federal
courthouse.' ") (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); 141 Cong. Rec. S14611-01, S14626-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) ("This landmark legislation will help bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits.... The crushing burden of
these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious claims."); id.
at S14628 (statement of Sen. Reid) ("The amendment establishes procedural hurdles that
will prevent frivolous lawsuits.").
13. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.
1999) (noting that "failure to state a claim" language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels that
of Rule 12(b)(6), and applying same de novo standard of review); Barren v. Harrington,
152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999); Black v.
Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(b)(6) standards in
reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)."). The rules of statutory construction would also support the borrowing of Rule 12(b)(6) standards in applying the "failure
to state a claim" language of the three PLRA dismissal provisions. See Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (stating that similar language in
two different civil rights laws should be interpreted similarly; White v. Mercury Marine,
Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1434, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997) ("It is a familiar
canon of statutory construction that courts should generally construe similar statutory
language similarly... Congress is assumed to act with the knowledge of existing law
and interpretations when it passes new legislation."); Stiltuer v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74
F.3d 1473, 1483 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The '[i]ncorporation of identical or similar language
from an act with a related purpose evidences some intention to use it in a similar vein.' ")
(alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1985)); United States v. Chu, 5 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Stribling
v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352 (8th Cir. 1969) (When interpreting statute, "express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia
but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or coguate relationships may control by force of analogy."); see also cases cited in note 8, supra.
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The significant overlap between the types of dismissals permitted
under the three PLRA dismissal provisions should also be recognized.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Neitzke v. Williams,14 all frivolous
actions are also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim; however,

all actions subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim are not necessarily frivolous. 15 Actions which fail to state a claim encompass both
those which lack any arguable basis in law or fact (i.e., frivolous actions)
and those which have such an arguable
basis but which are ultimately
6
law.'
prevailing
under
meritless
found
With regard to claims for damages against immune parties, the Su-

preme Court has made clear that such claims lack an arguable basis in
law and, thus, may be dismissed as frivolous. 17 For this reason, claims
for damages against immune parties will be discussed separately only

when necessary. In all other instances, such claims will be treated as
subsumed within the category of frivolous claims.
Additionally, a few important differences between the three statutes
should be noted. For example, § 1915(e) applies to all informapauperis
litigants, whether incarcerated or not.' 8 On the other hand, § 1915A spe-

cifically applies only to prisoner complaints and § 1997e(c) only to
prison condition cases brought by prisoners.

Moreover, unlike

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), which specifically authorizes the dismissal of actions

and appeals,' 9 § 1915A(b) specifically authorizes only the dismissal of
14. 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
15. See id. at 326-28. Where a complaint "which fails to state a claim lacks even
an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) both counsel dismissal." Id. at 328.
However, "[w]hen a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court
ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6)
grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not." Id; see also
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1992) (discussing Nietzke).
16. SeeNeitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-28.
17. See id. at 327 (giving "claims against which it is clear that the defendants are
immune from suit" as example of claims which may be dismissed under § 1915(d) as
"based on an indisputably meritless legal theory").
18. See Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that § 1915 applies to both prisoners and non-prisoners, despite ambiguous language added to § 1915(a)(1) by PLRA).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1998) ("[T]he court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that.., the action or appeal.., is frivolous or
malicious; ... fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted; or ... seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
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"complaints" 20 and § 1997e(c) specifically authorizes only the dismissal
of "actions." 21 Where Congress has used certain language in one part of
a statute and different language in another, it is assumed that different
meanings were intended. 2 Because neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history suggests a different interpretation, it is concluded
that appellate courts are not authorized to dismiss appeals or portions of

appeals under § 1915A(b) or § 1997e(c).23

Finally, it is noted that there is some ambiguity concerning the types
of prisoner actions that are included within the scope of § 1915A and

§ 1997e(c). Although § 1915A states that it applies to "civil action[s] in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity," 24 it does not specifically require that

the governmental entity, officer or employee be a party in the suit. Howcommon sense indicate that this is
ever, both the legislative history 2and
5
phrase.
quoted
the
of
the meaning

20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Supp. HI 1998) ("On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint... (1) is frivolous .... ).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (Supp. 111 1998) ("The court shall ... dismiss any
action... if... satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim...,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
22. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d
720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 96 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CoNsTRucnoN § 46.07 (5th ed. 1992 and Supp. 1996)); United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d
65, 71 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("As a general matter, the use of different words within the same
statutory context strongly suggests that different meanings were intended."); Leisnoi, Inc.
v. Stratman, 154 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Congress' use of two distinct phrases
leads us to conclude that two different meanings were intended.") (citing 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed.
1992 and Supp. 1997)); Cabell Huntington Hosp. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 988 (4th Cir.
1996); Florida Pub. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 54 F.3d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
23. See Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 186 (2nd Cir. 1996) ("[T]he [§ 1915A]
screening procedure appears to be designed for district courts, since it refers to review of
a complaint, rather than an appeal.").
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (Supp. 1111998).
25. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-378, 1995 WL 717401 (1995) ("Section 805 [of the
PLRA] adds a new section 1915A to 28 U.S.C. to require early judicial screening and
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Likewise, although § 1997e(c) applies to actions "brought in respect

to prison conditions," 6 it is unclear what might qualify as a "prison conditions" case. While complaints concerning the conditions of incarcera-

tion imposed on all or many prisoners in a facility would surely qualify,
it is unclear whether the conditions that a single prisoner must endure
would also qualify, particularly if the conditions appear to be aberra-

tional. For example, the food and heat provided for an entire prison
population could provide grounds for a prison conditions case, but a single beating of a single prisoner by a single guard may or may
not be en27
compassed by the phrase "prison conditions" in § 1997e(c).

prompt dismissal of clearly meritless suits against governmental entities or employees.");
141 CoNG. REC. S14408-01, S14417 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (PLRA section summary)
("Section 5: Judicial Screening: Requires judicial pre-screening of prisoner suits against
government entities or employees."). Common sense also suggests that the quoted phrase
refers to actions against government defendants since redress from a governmental entity
or person is unlikely to be obtained without that entity or person being made a party.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (Supp. 1111998).
27. Compare Carter v. Kiernan, No. 98 Civ. 2664 (JGK), 1999 WL 14014, at *3*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1999) (holding that § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement does not
apply to Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, and rejecting use of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1998), which defines prison conditions case as "any civil
proceeding arising under Federal Law with respect to the conditions of confinement or
the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison"),
and Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413 (BSJ), 1998 WL 778396, at *3-*5 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 5, 1998) (unpublished order) (same), with Dmytryszyn v. Hickox, 172 F.3d 62,
1999 WL 59622, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a
challenge to the amount of compensation received for work performed outside prison
falls within § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement), Jones v. Culinary Manager II, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 491, 494-95, 495 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that sexual harassment claim
falls within § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement), Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility,
28 F.Supp.2d 884, 887-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that exhaustion requirement applies
to Eighth Amendment excessive force claims), and Bartholomew v. Hill, 163 F.3d 605,
1998 WL 658655, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (giving broad reading to "conditions of confinement" and quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)). It is noted that
some of the legislative history appears to construe the exhaustion requirement of
§ 1997e(a), and by implication the coverage of § 1997e(c), rather expansively. See 142
CONG. REC. S3703, S3704 (daily ed. April 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("In
addition, State prisoners would have to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a
lawsuit in Federal court."); 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01, S14414 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[PLRA] requires State prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in Federal court."); id. at S14417 (PLRA section
summary) ("[§ 1997e] [r]equires inmates' administrative remedies be exhausted prior to
the filing of a suit in federal court."); 141 CONG. REc. 14573 (May 25, 1995) (statement
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However, since all prisoner suits are also covered by § 1915(e)(2), as
discussed elsewhere in this article, the ambiguities noted in the above
two paragraphs will not significantly affect the screening and dismissal
procedures discussed in this article.28

B.

DismissalofFee-PaidActionsandAppeals

The dismissal provisions of § 1915A and § 1997e(c) clearly apply to
9
all prisoner suits, whether informapauperisor fee-paid.
As to fee-paid actions and appeals filed by non-prisoners, an argument could be made that the language, "[n]otwithstanding any filing
fee," 30 in § 1915(e)(2) means that all actions and appeals, fee-paid or in
forma pauperis, which meet the criteria of that provision may be dismissed under it. At least three circuit panels have reached this conclusion.31 However, a review of the entire statute and its legislative history

of Sen. Kyl) ("Section 7 of this bill would require an inmate, prior to filing a complaint
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, to exhaust all available administrative remedies.").
28. However, the meaning of the phrase "prison conditions" will significantly affect whether a particular case is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (c) (Supp. HI 1998); see also cases cited supra note 26. But if
an action is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or is against an immune defendant, and therefore eligible for dismissal under § 1997e(c)(1), exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be required. See § 1997e(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1998).
Aside from other ambiguities which are discussed in this article, there are a number
of other PLRA drafting problems which are slowly being sorted out by the courts. See,
e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 603 (6th Cir. 1997) ("When Congress
penned the [PLRA], the watchdog must have been dead. The statute contains typographical errors, creates conflicts with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and is internally
inconsistent. Moreover the year in its name, 1995, does not correspond to the date of its
enactment, 1996.") (citations omitted).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) & (b) (Supp. 1 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (Supp.
Im 1998); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing §1915A); Carr
v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 57980 (5th Cir. 1998) (same), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 2405 (1999); Ricks v. Mackey, 141 F.3d
1185, 1998 WL 133828, at *1-*2 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (discussing §1915(e)(2), §1915A, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); McGore, 114
F.3d at 604-05, 608 (discussing § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (Supp. I 1998).
31. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09 ("Even if a non-prisoner pays the filing fee
and/or is represented by counsel, the complaint must be screened under § 1915(e)(2).
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strongly suggests that the phrase "filing fee" in § 1915(e)(2) refers only

to the fees paid by prisoners, particularly those paid pursuant to

§ 1915(b), which requires prisoners to pay the full filing fee even if they
proceed informapauperis.
When read in the context of § 1915 in its entirety, 33 the "filing fee"

language of § 1915(e)(2) is ambiguous. While it may be read as include-

ing all fee-paid litigants within the scope of that subsection, other portions of § 1915 suggest otherwise.34 Three examples may be readily

The language of § 1915(e)(2) does not differentiate between cases filed by prisoners and
cases filed by non-prisoners.... Section 1915(e)(2) provides us with the ability to screen
[fee-paid non-prisoner actions], as well as prisoner cases that satisfy the requirements of
this section.... The moment the complaint is filed, it is subject to review under
§ 1915(e)(2). The complaint must be dismissed if it falls within the requirements of
§ 1915(e)(2) when filed."); Rowe, 196 F.3d at 783; Ricks, 1998 WL 133828, at *1-*2; In
re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (administrative order of
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., C.J.); see also Rowsey v. Swinson, 156 F.3d 1244, 1998 WL
482800, at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (finding prisoner who paid
filing fee after being granted IFP status covered by §1915(e)(2)). But see Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015-17 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding §1915(e)(2) inapplicable to
actions that are not pursued informapauperis;describing contrary language in McGore
as dicta); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL,
ExTERNAL & PUB. AFFAIRS, OVERVIEW OF PRISON LITIGATION AMENDMENTS 7 (1996)
(describing amendment to § 1915 as "requir[ing] a court, regardless of whether any filing
fee or a portion thereof that [sic] may have been paid, to dismiss at any time an action in
which the plaintiff is proceeding IFP if the court determines that" the action falls within
one of the § 1915(e)(2) categories) (on file with the New York Law SchoolLaw Review).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (Supp. 111 1998), which provides, inter alia, that
"if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall
be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee." Subsections 1915(b)(1) and (2) set
forth the procedure for payment of a prisoner's filing fee in installments.
33. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508
U.S. 439, 455 (1993), ("Over and over we have stressed that '[i]n expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' ... Statutory construction 'is a
holistic endeavor,' and, at a minimum, must account for a statute's full text, language as
well as punctuation, structure, and subject matter.") (first alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Heirs ofBoisdore, 8 How. 112, 121 (1850), and United Savings Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier,Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.").
34. See supra authorities at note 30 (reaching different conclusions concerning
"fee-paid" language in § 1915(e)(2)).
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found: First, § 1915 is still entitled "Proceedings in forma pauperis";
second, § 1915(e)(2)(A) refers to "the allegation of poverty" although
such reference would make no sense in a fee-paid case; and third,
§ 1915(e)(2), in requiring dismissal of "the case" appears to be referring
to the informapauperisproceedings discussed in prior subsections.
When statutory language is ambiguous, the legislative history may
be used to interpret the statute.35 In this instance, the reference to filing
fees in § 1915(e)(2) was added at the same time that § 1915(a) and (b)
were amended to require payment of filing fees by prisoners proceeding
in forma pauperis and other provisions were amended to address other
aspects of prisoner litigation. 6 Moreover, the legislative history indicates that Congress, when amending the fee-related provisions of § 1915,
was concerned only with providing prisoners with financial disincentive

from filing actions or appeals of questionable merit and with reducing

the number of meritless prisoner lawsuits.37 Thus, when read in the
context of the entire statute and the legislative history, it is concluded
that § 1915(e)(2) does not authorize the dismissal of fee-paid actions
filed by non-prisoners.3 8

35. See White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1432
(11th Cir. 1997); Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir. 1996)
(and cases cited therein); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 76 n.3 (1984)
(interpreting criminal statute).
36. See § 1915(f)(2) (Supp. UI 1998) (concerning imposition of costs against prisoners); § 1915(g) (Supp. 1111998) (concerning prisoners who have brought three or more
prior meritless actions or appeals); § 1915(h) (Supp. III 1998) (defining "prisoner").
37. See 141 CONG. REc. S14413-14, S14417-18 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statements of Sens. Dole, Hatch and Kyl and section summary); 141 CONG. REC. S7524-25,
S7526-27 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statements of Sens. Dole and Kyl); see also 141
CONG. REC. S14626-29 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statements of Sens. Dole, Hatch, Reid,
Thurmond, Biden and Kyl); 141 CONG. REc. H14106 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Canady); Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275-76 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[A]
plethora of legislative history [exists] establishing that the PLRA was applicable only to
prisoners." "[T]he legislation was enacted to require only prisoners to pay the entire sum
of their fees and costs. Congress expressly wanted to prevent 'convicted criminals' from
getting 'preferential treatment' and to force prisoners to face the same 'economic downside' as the 'average law-abiding' citizen. The thrust of the legislation was to impede
inmates from initiating frivolous legal proceedings.") (citations omitted).
38. The Sixth Circuit's conclusion in McGore that § 1915(e)(2) is applicable to
fee-paid actions was dismissed as dicta in Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir.
1999), where a later panel of judges found § 1915(e)(2) inapplicable to actions that are
not pursued in forma pauperis. The plaintiff in Benson appears to have been a non-
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With regard to prisoners who pay the full filing fee at the com-

mencement of the action, it is not entirely clear whether their actions are
subject to screening and dismissal under § 1915(e). The legislative intent
to provide prisoners with financial disincentives from filing meritless
actions obviously does not cover those prisoners who pay the full fee,
and a statute ostensibly governing in forma pauperis actions is an unlikely place to require the screening and dismissal of fee-paid actions.
Nonetheless, the language "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any partial portion thereof,"39 clearly anticipates payment of either a full fee or a
partial fee, and the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with all prisoner litigation, although members of Congress expressed particular umbrage with in forma pauperis prisoner litigation.40
Thus, fee-paid prisoner actions should be held to fall within the require41
ments of § 1915(e).
To a large degree, however, excluding all or certain fee-paid actions
and appeals from the coverage of § 1915(e) would make little difference
since all frivolous civil actions and appeals, whether or not they fall
within § 1915(e)(2), are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent
authority of the court.42
prisoner. See also Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177, 1179 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (§
1915(e)(2) does not apply to fee-paid cases); Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding, pursuant to Benson, that § 1915(e)(2) applies only to litigants proceeding
in forma pauperis;noting that plaintiff was neither a prisoner nor proceeding in forma
paupers); Porter v. Fox, 99 F.3d 271, 273 n.1 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that PLRA procedures allowing dismissal for failure to state a claim did not apply since the plaintiff was
neither proceeding in forma pauperis nor a prisoner). The Seventh Ciruit held in Hrobowski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 203 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2000), that §
1915(e)(2) did not apply to a plaintiff who was not proceeding informa pauperis (and
who was apparently not a prisoner). However, seven months earlier, the same court held
that "district courts have the power to screen [and dismiss] complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status," citing to §
1915(e)(2)(B). Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). The Rowe decision is
not discussed in Hrobowski.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
40. See supra authorities cited notes 11 and 37.
41. But see Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
prisoner's complaint, which was not filed informapauperis,could not be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)).

42. See, e.g., Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989)
(dictum) ("Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious'
action, but there is little doubt they would have the power to do so even in the absence of
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C. FrivolousnessandSubject MatterJurisdiction
The authority of a federal court to dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis and fee-paid actions stems from the court's obligation to ensure
that it has subject matter jurisdiction over each action on its docket.
Where the court's jurisdiction depends on the presence of a federal question, the court should dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when
the federal question is ".so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,' 'wholly insubstantial,' 'obviously frivolous,'
'plainly unsubstantial,' or 'no longer open to discussion.' ',3

this statutory provision."); Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,
363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (district courts have inherent authority to dismiss frivolous feepaid actions); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]his court has inherent
authority, wholly aside from any statutory warrant, to dismiss an appeal or petition for
review as frivolous when the appeal or petition presents no arguably meritorious issue for
our consideration.") (footnote omitted). But see Tyler v. Carter, 151 F.R.D. 537, 539-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing factually frivolous fee-paid action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) without discussing the court's inherent authority), affd, 41 F.3d
1500 (2d Cir. 1994). The inherent authority of the federal courts only partially renders
academic the issue of whether § 1915(e)(2) authorizes the dismissal of fee-paid frivolous
actions filed by non-prisoners. As discussed later in the text, it is possible that different
screening procedures and timing requirements may apply depending on whether a frivolousness dismissal is based on § 1915(e)(2) or the courts' inherent authority.
43. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations omitted); accord
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1978); Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974) (test is whether right claimed is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of
the District Court"); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) ("a suit may sometimes
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or
federal statutes ... is wholly insubstantial and frivolous," and finding claim at issue was
not "so patently without merit as to justify... the court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction").
Cases in which jurisdiction depends on the presence of a federal question are not
limited to those filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For example, in Hagans, the substantiality-frivolousness test was applied to an action in which 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and
(4) was alleged as the jurisdictional basis. See Hagans,415 U.S. at 532, 535-36. Federal
questions may also serve as the jurisdictional predicate in actions brought pursuant to,
inter alia, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty, maritime and prizes), 1334 (bankruptcy), 1336
(Interstate Commerce Commission orders), 1337 (commerce and antitrust regulations),
1338 (patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc.), 1339 (postal matters), 1340 (internal revenue, customs), 1344 (certain election disputes), 1345 (United States as plaintiff), 1346
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While the analytical soundness of the substantiality-frivolousness
component of subject matter jurisdiction doctrine has been questioned,44

it has long been accepted by the courts4 5 and will not be discussed in any

great detail here. However, in short, it can be argued that frivolousness
is as much a matter of subject matter jurisdiction as mootness: whether a
claim is frivolous or moot, the court lacks power to assume jurisdiction
because there is no actual case or controversy as required by Article III
of the Constitution.46 With regard to the mootness doctrine, the Supreme
Court has "frequently repeated that federal courts are without power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. To be cognizable in a federal court, a suit 'must be definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.' ,A
Like moot questions, frivolous questions cannot affect the substantive rights of the litigants and are not definite and concrete matters which
touch the legal relations of parties with genuinely adverse legal interests.
Simply put, a frivolous question does not present the court with an ac48
tual, or legally cognizable, controversy.

(United States as defendant), 1350 (alien tort actions), 1352 (bonds executed under federal law), 1353 (Indian allotments), 1355 (federal fines, penalty or forfeiture), 1356 (nonadmiral/maritime seizures), 1357 (injury under federal law), 1358 (eminent domain),
1362 (Indian tribes), and 1363 (jurors' employment rights).
44. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 538; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970)
(characterized as "more ancient than analytically sound"); Bell, 327 U.S. at 683; The Fair
v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (where federal statutory claim is
frivolous, "jurisdiction would not be denied, except possibly in form"); see also Yazoo
County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160-62 (1982), denying cert. to
637 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that possible conflict
between Bell's frivolousness test and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) merits grant
of certiorari).
45. See Hagans,415 U.S. at 536-38.
46. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (stating on issue of mootness that "[u]nder Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies"); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
316 (1974) (mootness doctrine); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)

(same).
47. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246 (citations omitted) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,240-41 (1937)).
48. In one of many decisions on the subject, the Supreme Court noted that
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The substantiality-frivolousness doctrine applies only to cases in
which jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal question; it does
not apply to diversity jurisdiction cases. 49 However, a frivolous diversity
claim should be dismissible for lack of subject matter jurisdiction either
because it does not present an actual case or controversy or because the
frivolousness of the claim necessarily means that the jurisdictional
amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 50 cannot be satisfied. As held
by the Supreme Court, a diversity claim may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction if it "appear[s] to a legal51certainty that the claim is really for
less than the jurisdictional amount."

[J]urisdiction, as distinguished from merits, is wanting where the

claim set forth in the pleading is plainly unsubstantial.... And the
federal question averred may be plainly unsubstantial either because
obviously without merit, or "because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the
subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought
to be raised can be the subject of controversy."
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933) (quoting Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910)); accordLeonard v. Vicksburg,
Shreveport & Pacific R.R., 198 U.S. 416, 422 (1905) ("[T]he Federal question thus suggested had been so explicitly foreclosed by previous decisions as to leave no room for

real controversy.").
49. See, e.g., Hagans,415 U.S. at 537 ("In the absence of diversity of citizenship,
it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal question should be presented.")
(quoting Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31 (1933)).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), in pertinent part, states as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1998).
51. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). In
further defining the circumstances under which a diversity action should be dismissed for
lack ofjurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that such a dismissal was appropriate if
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Unlike a frivolousness dismissal, which indicates a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, a dismissal for failure to state a claim is merits-based.

Although this distinction was rendered meaningless, insofar as screening
and dismissal procedures are concerned, for those actions subject to immediate dismissal under the PLRA dismissal provisions, it retains significance for those actions that do not fall within the purview of those
provisions. For example, as discussed in Part II.B. of this article, the

distinction between an action which is frivolous and one which fails to

state a claim may affect the timing of the dismissal when the litigant is a

fee-paid non-prisoner.

from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that
the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed, or if, from the
proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never
was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore
colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that while subjective good faith in pleading the jurisdictional amount is a
factor in determining subject matter jurisdiction, good faith alone does not control where
it is apparent that, "to a legal certainty," the plaintiff could not recover the requisite jurisdictional amount).
The similarity between the "legal certainty" test for diversity actions and the substantiality-frivolousness test for federal question actions was noted by the Seventh Circuit
in PrattCent.ParkLtd. P'shipv. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 1995):
Bell v. Hood held that if a claim purportedly based on federal law is
not frivolous, then the court has jurisdiction even if the plaintiff ultimately loses. Similarly, if a complaint sets out a dispute substantial
enough to come within the diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiffs inability to prove an injury exceeding the minimum amount in controversy does not affect jurisdiction.
60 F.3d at 351 (citations omitted); accordid. at 354 ("Whether a claim falls beneath the
jurisdictional minimum 'to a legal certainty' is a cousin to the question whether a particular argument is 'frivolous' ... ).
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II.

A.

DISMIlSSAL OFFEDERAL ACTIONS,

PROCEDURES FOR SCREENiNG AND DISMIssING CASES

The Standardsfor Determining Whether an Action is Frivolousor
Fails to State a Claim

1. Frivolous Actions
The same frivolousness test applies to both informapauperisactions
and fee-paid actions.52 As noted by the Supreme Court in Coppedge v.
United States,53 application of the same frivolousness test to both types
of actions simply reflects the obligation of the courts
to assure to the greatest degree possible, within the
statutory framework for [actions] created by Congress,
equal treatment for every litigant before the bar.... The
point of equating the test for allowing a pauper's [action]
to the test for dismissing paid cases, is to assure equality
of consideration for all litigants. 4

52. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962); Pillay v. INS, 45
F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)
("Unless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case
of a nonindigent litigant, FED. RULES CRIM. PROC. 39(a), the request of an indigent
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed."); Kremer v. Clarke, 285 F.2d
735, 737 (6th Cir. 1960) ("[L]eave to appeal in forma pauperis is discretionary and
should not be granted if the appeal would be dismissed regardless of the pauperous condition of the appellant.") (citation omitted); Young v. United States, 267 F.2d 692, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1959) ("Frivolousness is a ground for dismissing an appeal in forma pauperis
under 28 U.S.C § 1915 (1952) and a prepaid appeal under [Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure] 39."). Moreover, it appears the same frivolousness test is used for both
criminal and civil cases. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (approving
use of close variants of the definition of legal frivolousness articulated in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), for evaluation of frivolousness under § 1915(d));
Kremer, 285 F.2d at 737 (relying on Ellis frivolousness test in civil action).
53. 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
54. Id. at 446-47. Although the Court was discussing informa pauperis appeals,
its language is equally applicable to actions proceeding in forma pauperis in district
courts. As noted later in the text in Part II.B.2.a, although Coppedge required equal
treatment of in forma pauperis and fee-paid litigants, in Neitzke, the Supreme Court
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One circuit court, in construing Coppedge, stated that "[a] constitutional construction of section 1915 must be that every litigant is entitled
to file a notice of appeal but every litigant is subject to a summary
disis frivolous on its face." 55

missal if it can be shown his appeal

An action may be dismissed as frivolous if"it lacks an arguable basis

either in law or in fact.",56 In making a frivolousness determination,

judges not only have "the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indis-

putably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the
veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." 57 Thus, the court is not
bound, as it usually is when making a determination solely on the plead-

ings, to accept the factual allegations as true.58 Factual allegations which

are "clearly baseless" include those which "describ[e] fantastic or delu-

sional scenarios,"59 those which are "fanciful,

60

and those which "rise to

the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible., 61 However, an action
may not be dismissed as frivolous simply because the plaintiffs allega-

tions are unlikely or improbable. 62 Moreover, in making a frivolousness
determination, the assessment of the plaintiffs factual allegations "must

found special treatment for informapauperis applicants justified since those litigants do
not have the same economic incentive as paying litigants to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious or repetitive lawsuits. See Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 324. However, Neitzke does not
state that different frivolousness tests apply to in forma pauperis and fee-paid litigants
and does not prevent a fee-paid litigant's case from being reviewed for possible frivolousness. In fact, the Neitzke decision states that it is intended to further the goal of assuring equality between all litigants, as previously articulated in Coppedge. See id. at
329. It appears that the different treatment discussed in Neitzke refers only to the initial
mandatory screening of informapauperisactions at the inception of the case.
55. Perry v. Ralston, 635 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1980).
56. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. In Neitzke, the Supreme Court distinguished between
the standard for dismissing under § 1915(d) and the standard for dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that "[a] complaint filed informa
pauperisis not automatically frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d) because it fails to
state a claim." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 331; accordThomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 605 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
57.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

58. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
59.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328.

60. Id. at 325.
61. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
62.

See id.
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be weighed in favor of the plaintiff' and must not "serve as a factfinding
process for the resolution of disputed facts. 63
In setting forth the preceding guidelines in Neitzke and Denton, the
Supreme Court declined to define the phrase "clearly baseless" with
more precision, finding that the district courts were in the best position to
determine which cases fell into the category: 4 The need for further guidance in this area is discussed in Part IV of this article.
2.

Actions Which Fail to State a Claim

In determining whether an action should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim, the court must "accept the material facts alleged in the

complaint as true, and not dismiss 'unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.' 65 Moreover, all reasonable inferences must be
drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs,66 and the
court should consider only those facts alleged in the complaint. 67 However, while a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may not be based on a "judge's

disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations," 68 conclusions of law and
63. Id. at 32.
64. See id. at 33; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. In Denton, the Supreme Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit's holding that a complaint could be dismissed as factually frivolous
only if the allegations conflicted with judicially noticeable facts. The Court also found
that a § 1915(d) dismissal on grounds of frivolousness (a) was to be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion and (b) had only a limited res judicata effect on later filings. Denton,
504 U.S. at 33-34.
65. Easton v. Sundramn, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); accordValmonte v. Bane, 18
F.3d 992, 998 (2d Cir. 1994). The standard stated in Conley and Easton "applies with
particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations or where the complaint is
submitted pro se." Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998).
66. See, e.g., Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996); Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993).
67. See, e.g., Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660,
662 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where district court "improperly
relied upon extra-complaint information" and factual allegations in complaint stated a
claim); see also Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that district court erred in considering affidavits and exhibits in granting motion to dismiss,
without notifying plaintiff it was converting motion to one for summary judgment and
providing plaintiff with opportunity to respond).
68. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
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"unwarranted deductions
of fact" pleaded in the complaint need not be
69
accepted as true.
B.

The Screening Processand TiYming of Dismissals

1. In FormaPauperisCases Not Filed by Prisoners
Under § 1915(e)(2), the courts are required to dismiss "at any time"
an informapauperisaction or appeal which is frivolous or fails to state a
claim. 7 The initial § 1915(e)(2) screening should occur at the commencement of the action or appeal when the in forma pauperis applica-

tion is considered. 71 In the district court, the initial screening usually will

occur prior to service of process.72 However, if in forma pauperis status
is granted and it is only at some later date that the court determines, sua

sponte or on motion, that the action or appeal is frivolous or fails to state
a claim, the action or appeal must be dismissed at that point under

§ 1915(e)(2).73 For example, if, in deciding a motion for appointment of

69. First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 771 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting 2A JAMES WM. MOoRE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.08, at 2266-69
(2d ed. 1984).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (Supp. III 1998) (stating that "court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines that" the case falls within § 1915(e)(2)(A) or (B))
(emphasis added).
71. SeeNeitzke, 490 U.S. at324, 327-28.
72. See id. at 324; McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir.
1997) ("The [§ 1915(e)(2)] screening must occur even before process is served or the
individual has had an opportunity to amend the complaint. The moment the complaint is
filed, it is subject to review under § 1915(e)(2). The complaint must be dismissed if it
falls within the requirements of § 1915(e)(2) when filed."); In re Prison Litig. Reform
Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (administrative order of Boyce F. Martin, Jr.,

C.J.) (same).
73. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 608 ("§ 1915(e)(2) is applicable throughout the entire litigation process. A case that may not initially appear to meet § 1915(e)(2) may be
dismissed at a future date should it become apparent that the case satisfies this section.");
In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d at 1134 (same). See e.g., United States v. Visconti, 261 F.2d 215, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1958). In Visconti, the district court had granted in
forma pauperis status. On appeal, the defendant asked the appellate court for appointment of counsel, and the government cross-moved to dismiss the appeal. The Second
Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous and found that in forma pauperis status was
improvidently granted by the district court. See id.
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counsel in a case previously permitted to proceed in forma pauperis,the
court reviews the merits of the action and finds that it is frivolous or fails
to state a claim, the case must then be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2). 74
Screening for frivolousness and failure to state a claim is an ongoing obligation of the federal courts under § 1915(e)(2).
2.

Fee-Paid Cases Not Filed by Prisoners
a.

Screening

As previously concluded in Part I.B. of this article, there is no statutory mechanism for the automatic across-the-board screening of nonprisoner fee-paid cases for frivolousness or failure to state a claim.
However, equal protection principles would require that some elements
of the screening performed on informapauperiscases be adapted for use
in fee-paid cases.
In Coppedge, the Supreme Court, in discussing the procedures employed by the courts of appeals in dealing with frivolous appeals, stated
the following:
If it were the practice of a Court of Appeals to screen the
paid appeals on its docket for frivolity, without hearing
oral argument, reviewing a record of the trial proceedings or considering full briefs, paupers could, of course,
be bound by the same rules. But, if the practice of the
Court of Appeals is to defer rulings on motions to dismiss paid appeals until the court has had the benefit of
hearing argument and considering briefs and an adequate
record, we hold it must no less accord the poor person
the same procedural rights.75
It is possible to interpret Coppedge as requiring, on both the district
court and appellate levels, that all actions, fee-paid and in forma pau-

74. Such a dismissal may be ordered either by the court which initially permitted
the suit to proceed informa pauperis or, as in Visconti, by an appellate court later handling the action. See supracases cited note 72.
75. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,448 (1962)
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peris, be formally screened at the outset. However, in courts with a sizable docket, such an across-the-board review might constitute a substantial burden on the court, with no guarantee that such vigilance would be
rewarded with a significant reduction in the number of fee-paid cases
going forward. In any event, after Neitzke and enactment of the PLRA, it
appears unlikely that the Supreme Court would now find any such obligation on the part of either the district courts or courts of appeal.
In Neitzke, the Supreme Court indicated that special treatment of in
forma pauperis actions, i.e., the § 1915(e) screening process, was justified by the fact that litigants proceeding in forma pauperis lacked economic incentive to refrain from filing meritless lawsuits.76 Similarly, the
PLRA's legislative history makes clear that virtually the same rationale
7
underlay the PLRA filing fee, screening, and dismissal amendments
For this reason, it appears that the Supreme Court, notwithstanding Coppedge, would not now find that equal protection concerns require that all
fee-paid actions be initially screened in the same manner as in forma
pauperisactions.78
However, the distinction drawn in Neitzke and the PLRA legislative
history does not end the equal protection analysis. While the economic
incentive distinction justifies special treatment for informapauperis and

prisoner actions at the initial filing stage, when the merits would not
normally be reviewed, it does not justify privileged treatment for fee-

76. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 327-28.
77. See supra authorities cited note 36.
78. Several circuit courts have found that the PLRA prisoner filing fee provisions
do not violate equal protection, or other constitutional rights, since those provisions are
rationally related to the legitimate government interest in deterring the filing of meritless
prisoner cases. See Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1299-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1998); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17,
19-21 (2d Cir. 1997); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1487-89 (11th Cir. 1997);
Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281,
1286-87 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that PLRA limit on attorneys' fees paid to prisoners' counsel did not violate
equal protection). In reaching this conclusion, use of strict scrutiny was rejected in favor
of the rational basis test. See Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1300; Nicholas, 114 F.3d at 20; Roller,
107 F.3d at 233; Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286. Likewise, courts also have used the rational basis test in finding that § 1997e(e), which bars prisoners from filing complaints
for mental or emotional injury absent a showing of physical injury, also does not violate
equal protection. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1997).
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paid actions at other stages when the merits need to be examined for
some reason other than screening purposes (e.g., when a merits-related
motion is filed). At those junctures, the economic incentive distinction is
irrelevant, since the action is already filed and the initial screening completed, and review of the merits is not an extra burden.
Specifically, if a federal court has occasion to review the merits of a
fee-paid action, at any point in the proceedings, and determines that the
complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim, it should dismiss the action without delay. In other words, all fee-paid and in forma pauperis
actions which are reviewed on their merits should be treated similarlyscreening for frivolousness or failure to state a claim should be an automatic part of such a merits review. If a court is aware that an action is
privilege should be accorded
frivolous or fails to state a claim, no special
79
paid
was
fee
filing
the
simply because
A "merits review" is performed whenever the court has occasion, on
motion or sua sponte, to review the merits of the action. It is not limited
to instances where dispositive motions, such as those filed pursuant to
Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are under consideration. For example, motions for injunctions and appointment of
counsel in civil cases require the district court to examine, in part, the
movants' likelihood of success on the merits; 80 motions for transcripts at

79. Thus, equal protection is satisfied when all complaints, fee-paid and in forma
pauperis, are eligible for dismissal at the earliest point a merits review is performed. In
the case of in forma pauperis actions, that first merits review is performed when the in
forma pauperis determination is made; in the case of fee-paid actions, the first merits
review may come as early as the typical in forma pauperis determination or later, depending on the timing of various pertinent motions and the case processing procedures
followed by the individual courts.
Dismissal of a clearly meritless fee-paid action at the time that a motion draws the
court's attention to the merits is only logical. In fact, it is this same logic that underlies
§ 1915(e) screening: in determining whether a litigant should be permitted to proceed in
formapauperis,the court must review the merits of the action; if that review reveals that
the action is clearly meritless, it only makes sense to immediately dismiss.
80. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating that the standard for preliminary injunction requires irreparable harm should
injunction not be granted and either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping toward party
seeking injunctive relief); Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-74 (2d Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (holding that appointment of counsel in civil case, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) [now § 1915(e)(1)] or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, requires court to consider "likely
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government expense require a showing, in certain post-judgment crimi-

nal proceedings, that the proceeding is not frivolous, and, in other civil
actions, that
the proceeding "is not frivolous (but presents a substantial
81
question)."
Additionally, there may be other early junctures at which a district
court can weed out clearly meritless fee-paid actions, short of reviewing

every complaint in detail. Some district courts subject each complaint to
a minimal inspection to ensure that certain preliminary procedural requirements are fulfilled. For example, the complaint may be inspected at
the time of filing to ensure, among other things, that it is written legibly,

in English and on the proper size paper, contains certain required information, and is signed by the plaintiff.1 If such an inspection reveals that

the complaint may be clearly meritless, the complaint should be immediately screened for merit and, if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim,
dismissed.
b.

Timing of Dismissal
i.

Frivolous Cases

At the appellate level, a frivolous fee-paid appeal may be dismissed
by the court of appeals, sua sponte or on motion, whenever the frivolous
83

nature of the appeal comes to the attention of the court.

merit" of action); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(allowing counsel to be provided in
certain criminal and habeas corpus proceedings if "the interests ofjustice so require").
81. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1994).
82. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (specifying pleadings which may be filed); FED. R.
CIrv. P. 10 (describing the form of pleadings, including requirement that there be a caption with certain information and that the title of the complaint include the names of all
parties); FED. R. CIV. P. l1(a) (requiring all pleadings be signed, and unsigned pleadings
be stricken unless omission promptly corrected after being called to attention of attorney
or party).
83. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 310 (1996) (" '[i]t is well within
the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and
calendars to weed out frivolous claims.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 n.8 (1977)); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.
1995); McFadden v. United States, 436 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1971) (in deciding motion for
appointment of counsel in fee-paid appeal, court reviewed the district court file and sua
sponte dismissed the appeal as frivolous); United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d
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While it is clear that the district courts may also dismiss frivolous
fee-paid civil actions, also sua sponte or on motion, the timing of such
dismissals is subject to debate. As many as seven circuits (the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh) have issued opinions
holding that a fee-paid civil action may not be dismissed prior to the is84
suance of a summons and the opportunity to amend the complaint.

662, 665 n.2 (2d Cir. 1957) (en bane) (dictum); see also Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962) (noting that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 39(a) authorized dismissal of frivolous appeal brought by nonindigent appellant) (quoting Ellis v.
United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)). Former Rule 39(a) stated that "[t]he appellate
court may at any time entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal." FED. R. Clum. P. 39(a)
(abrogated Dec. 4, 1967, eff. July 1, 1968). Although the advisory committee notes to
Rule 39 state that the rule was "abrogated since the provisions of the rule are transferred
to and covered by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure," Advisory Committee
Notes, FED. R. CRim. P. 39, the latter rules contain no explicit counterpart to the quoted
portion of Rule 39(a), see generally Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
84. See Hughes v. City of Albany, 76 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); Butler v. Leen, 4
F.3d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1993); Clark v. Ocean Brand Tuna, 974 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir.
1992); Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1991); Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d
228, 230 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Funkhouser, 873 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989); Bryan
v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1987). The above-cited cases make clear that
actions in which a partial filing fee is permitted must be treated the same as actions in
which the full fee is paid. According to these cases, the plaintiff paying the fee is entitled
to immediate issuance of the summons and an opportunity to amend. See also Hake v.
Clarke, 91 F.3d 1129, 1132 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Neither Neitzke nor section 1915(d)
authorized courts initially to review claims filed by a fee-paying pro se litigant in the
same way that they reviewed IFP complaints. We find no support for the district court to
have conducted a frivolousness review of non-IFP pro se complaints, or to have conducted an initial review of all pro se complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) before service of
process and responsive pleadings."); Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946, 946-47 (7th Cir.
1974) (discussing, inter alia, Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1973), as feepaid case where summons should have been immediately issued). The Fourth Circuit has
held that a district court may not sua sponte dismiss as frivolous an action filed informa
pauperis after accepting a partial filing fee and should treat the action as fee-paid for
purposes of allowing amendment of the complaint. See Church v. Attorney Gen., 125
F.3d 210, 215 (4th Cir. 1997). Although the Third Circuit, in an en bane decision, disapproved of a district court's dismissal prior to service of the complaint, it nonetheless afirmed the dismissal in that case. See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 in. 2 & 3, 592
(3d Cir. 1966) (en banc); see also id. at 595 & n.3 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
In MeGore, the Sixth Circuit held that § 1915(e)(2) supersedes the holding of Clark
v. Ocean Brand Tuna and requires that all fee-paid actions be reviewed for frivolousness
prior to service of process and, if found to be frivolous, dismissed at that time. See
McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09; In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d at 1134. How-
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However, at least three of those circuits (the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth)

have also held that the district court may dismiss a fee-paid civil action

prior to issuance of the summons if the court lacks subject matter juris-

diction, e.g., where the complaint is wholly insubstantial or frivolous. 85

ever, as discussed in Part I.B. of the text, it does not appear that § 1915(e)(2) applies to
fee-paid actions filed by nonprisoners.
85. The Sixth Circuit held that a district court improperly dismissed a fee-paid action under § 1915(e)(2) but affirmed the dismissal on the alternate ground that the complaint was subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since its allegations
were not arguable plausible. See Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477,479-80 (6th Cir. 1999).
The relevant Ninth Circuit decisions are: Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227
n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A paid complaint that is 'obviously frivolous' does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction and may be dismissed sua sponte before service of process.") (citation omitted); Franklin v. Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is not required to issue a
summons or follow the other procedural requirements"; jurisdictional dismissal proper
where a claim under the Constitution or federal statutes "is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous"); Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 58 (9th Cir. 1967); Wright v. Rhay, 310 F.2d
687, 688 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that frivolous action may be denied informa pauperis
status at outset "generally only where it would be proper to dismiss the complaint sua
sponte before service of process if it were filed by one tendering the required fees");
Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962) (same); Harmon v. Superior
Court, 307 F.2d 796, 797 (9th Cir. 1962) (dismissal prior to service; "The District Court
always has power to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It can do so at any time that such
lack appears, and on its own motion.... But it cannot dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, unless such lack appears on the
face of the complaint and is obviously not curable.") (citations omitted).
The relevant Seventh Circuit opinion is Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d
1177, 1181-83 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit held that at the "first tier of review,"
the district court must assess the substantially of constitutional or federal statutory allegations to determine, inter alia,whether they are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous". If
so, the complaint must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. If the complaint is meritorious enough to proceed to the "second tier," Rule 4(a) requires "that
summons be issued and served before the complaint may be dismissed." Id.; accord,e.g.,
Sakovich v. City of Kankakee, 130 F.R.D. 394, 396 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (dismissing, pursuant
to Ricketts, fee-paid action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to issuance of
summons); see also O'Brien v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 998 F.2d 1394, 1399 (7th Cir.
1993) (dicta) ("a court may dismiss a case at any time for lack of subject matter jurisdiction"). But see Nowicki v. Cooper, 56 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir. 1995) ("There is authority
that a paid case cannot be dismissed, no matter how manifestly frivolous, before the summons is issued. We don't quite see why, [see] Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 134
(7th Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion), but will not pursue the question since a summons
did issue.") (first citation omitted); Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d at 134 (Tone &
Fairchild, JJ., concurring) (disagreeing with holding in Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946
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Additionally, the District of Columbia Circuit has gone even further and
affirmed a district court's sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) prior
to issuance of a summons where it was "patently obvious" the plaintiff

could not prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.86

The case law described above can be reconciled. None of the cases
which disapprove of a pre-summons dismissal of a fee-paid civil action
87
discuss subject matter jurisdiction or the substantiality doctrine. Thus,
(7th Cir. 1974), that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) requires issuance of summons
even though complaint is obviously meritless).
86. Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726-27 (D.C. Cir.
1990). The Baker decision does not state whether the complaint was fee-paid or informa
pauperis;however, the fact that § 1915(d) was never discussed as an alternate ground for
affirming the dismissal and the decision distinguished prior circuit case law concerning
dismissal under § 1915(d) suggests that the court's reasoning encompasses fee-paid
cases. See id. Opinions from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits may also be construed as
consistent with the approach of the Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. In
Tyler v. Pasqua,748 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Victorian
v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's sua
sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b) prior to issuance of the summons, although this procedure was specifically disapproved. See id. at 287. The circuit court distinguished a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction which must be noticed by the court even if not raised by the
defendant. See id. The distinction drawn by the Fifth Circuit between Rule 12(b) dismissals and subject matter jurisdiction dismissals can be construed as suggesting that the
latter type of dismissal may occur prior to issuance of the summons. With regard to the
Eighth Circuit, at least one district court in that circuit has concluded that Eighth Circuit
case law permits the sua sponte dismissal of both fee-paid and informapauperisactions
under Rule 12(b)(6). See Slangal v. Getzin, 148 F.R.D. 691, 695-97 (D. Neb. 1993);
Johnson v. Nebraska, Dep't of Correctional Servs., 806 F. Supp. 1412, 1413-16 (D. Neb.
1992); Tyler v. City of Omaha, 780 F. Supp. 1266, 1269-72 (D. Neb. 1991) (recommendation of Piester, Mag. J.).
87. The Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions which disapprove of pre-summons
dismissals (Bryan and Butler) must be read as consistent with the prior Seventh and Ninth
Circuit decisions holding that pre-summons dismissal is appropriate when subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking. See Butler v. Leen, 4 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);
Bryan v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1987). With regard to the Seventh Circuit,
there is no indication that it followed its procedure for overturning prior panel decisions.
See 7th Cir. R. 40(f) (stating that to overrule prior decision, the court must give all active
judges an opportunity to request en banc rehearing and note in its decision that such request was either not made or was outvoted). In the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge circuit
panel may not ordinarily overturn a prior decision of the circuit. See United States v.
Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit decisions disapproving of pre-summons dismissals cite to Franklin v. Oregon, State
Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (approving pre-summons dismissal of frivolous cases), for the proposition that a complaint is deemed filed upon payment of the
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the case law which permits pre-summons dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction can be characterized as establishing an exception to
the general rule that the summons must always issue upon filing of the
complaint.
In any event, even if the case law cannot be reconciled, it appears
that the cases permitting a pre-summons dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction are correct. First, they are consistent with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), its predecessor statute, 28 U.S.C. § 80
(1940)(superseded), and other case law relating to subject matter juris-

diction. Rule 12(h)(3) requires dismissal of an action "[w]henever it ap-

pears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.', 88 Section 80, in pertinent part, provided as

follows:
Ifin any suit commenced in a district court, ... it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the said district court, at any
time after such suit has been brought, . . . that such suit
does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said district court, ... the said district court shall proceed no
further therein, but shall dismiss the suit ....

filing fee, see Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 230 (11th Cir. 1990); Bryan, 821 F.2d at
457, and the Seventh Circuit's Bryan decision is either adopted or cited with approval in
the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits disapproving presummons dismissals.See also Butler v. Leen, 4 F.3d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1993); Clark v.
Ocean Brand Tuna, 974 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir. 1992); Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656, 657
(5th Cir. 1991); Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d 228, 230 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Funkhouser,
873 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit's decision in Hughes includes a
"cf" citation to Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984), with a parenthetical stating, "holding that, where plaintiff has paid filing fee, sua sponte dismissal of
suit prior to service of process and opportunity to amend is improper unless court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction." Hughes v. City of Albany, 76 F.3d. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).
The citations to the case law of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits suggest the possible recognition of an exception permitting pre-summons subject matter jurisdiction dismissals.
88. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 80 (1940) (emphasis added), superseded by Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, § 1359, 62 Stat. 935 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000)) and FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178,
183-84, 189 (1936) (discussing § 80).
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This portion of § 80 was omitted from its successor statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1359, and is only partly reflected in its successor rule, Rule
12(h)(3), because it was viewed as unnecessary: "Any court will dismiss
a case not within its jurisdiction when its attention is drawn to the fact, or
even on its own motion." 90 Thus, if a district court is made aware prior
to issuance of the summons that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking,
and
Rule 12(h)(3) and § 80 suggest that dismissal should be immediate
summons. 91
not delayed until after issuance and service of the
Similarly, the case law reflects the longstanding principle that a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is mandatory at any point
that the defect is discovered.92 While this usually means that it is never
too late to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as when the defect is first discovered on appeal,93 it should also be interpreted to mean that it is never

too early for such a dismissal. In fact, the district court might actually

lack authority to issue a summons in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

90. Historical and Revision Notes, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1999); see also FED. R. Crv.
P. 12(h)(3) advisory committee's note, 1937 Adoption, Note to Subdivision (h) ("This
rule continues U.S.C., Title 28, former § 80 dismissal or remand ([sic] of action over
which district court lacks jurisdiction).").
91. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) ("by
definition, a jurisdictional ruling may never be made prospective only").
92. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 (1992) ("A final determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case in a federal court, of course, precludes further adjudication of it."); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. M/V Hyundai
Emperor, 109 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (" 'a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived and may be raised [either by motion or] sua sponte' at any time") (alterations in original) (quoting United Food Local 919 v. Centermark Properties, 30 F.3d
298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994), and Alliance of Am. Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 605 (2d
Cir. 1988)); Manway Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth. of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua
sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has
subject matter jurisdiction; and, if it does not, dismissal is mandatory"); see also Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) ("subjectmatter jurisdiction cannot be waived and the issue can be raised at any time in the course
of litigation;" held that suit should have been dismissed at point during pretrial discovery
that lack of subject matter jurisdiction was discovered).
93. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986);
Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Until the judgment concluding a
suit becomes final by exhaustion of all appellate remedies (and sometimes not even then),
the existence ofjurisdiction over the suit can be challenged.") (citations omitted).
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Second, while various circuits have found that pre-summons dismissal conflicts with Rules 4 and 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure,94 those circuits did not consider the possibility that lack of subject
matter jurisdiction may render moot or inappropriate any Rule 4 or 15
requirements. Moreover, as noted by various judges in dissenting or

concurring opinions, there is nothing on the face of Rules 4 or 15 which

prohibits, or is inconsistent with, the dismissal of an action on subject

matter jurisdiction grounds prior to issuance of the summons. 95
Third, it would offend the interests of justice to require the judiciary

to expend resources on a frivolous law suit any longer than necessary
after the frivolous nature of the suit is revealed. Similarly, there is no
reason why defendants should be required to bear the expense and psy-

chological burden, both often substantial, of answering a complaint that
should never have been filed to begin with.96

94. See Hughes v. City of Albany, 76 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); Butler v. Leen, 4
F.3d 772, 773 (9th Cir. 1993); Clark v. Ocean Brand Tuna, 974 F.2d 48, 50 (6th Cir.
1992); Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1991); Herrick v. Collins, 914 F.2d
228, 230 (1lth Cir. 1990); In re Funkhouser, 873 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989); Bryan
v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d
946, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that district court may not sua sponte dismiss in
formapauperisaction without first issuing summons as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)).
95. See, e.g., Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 432-33 (3d Cir. 1990) (Van
Dusen, J., dissenting); Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975) (Tone,
C.J., and Fairchild, J., concurring).
96.

In Elliott v. Tilton, 62 F.3d 725 (5th Cir.), withdrawn, superseded by 69 F.3d

35 (5th Cir. 1995), withdrawn, superseded by 89 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 1996), after finding a
lack ofjurisdiction, the court stated the following:
We are troubled by the obvious waste of resources that results from
dismissing the case at this juncture for want of jurisdiction.... This
type of jurisdictional defect ordinarily should be discovered at an
early management or status conference prior to a substantial investment in case preparation. Unfortunately, it was not caught when it
should have been in this case. The time required to establish the legal
and factual basis for federal jurisdiction is a worthwhile investment.
More importantly, failing to do so, as in this case, is costly.
Id. at 729; accord Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) ("Dismissals on
[§ 1915(d)] grounds are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to
spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints."). Cf Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 113 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (premature dismissal of action will unnecessarily delay final disposition of case).
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ii. Cases Which Fail to State a Claim
With regard to fee-paid appeals, there is currently no authority for
dismissing a non-prisoner's non-frivolous appeal for failure to state a

claim. Such appeals, in general, are to proceed to full briefing and be
decided in the usual course.
On the trial court level, as discussed above, the clear consensus

among the circuits, at least where subject matter jurisdiction is not at issue, is that a fee-paid action may not be dismissed prior to issuance of

the summons and an opportunity to amend.97 After passage of the
PLRA, of course, this rule only applies to non-prisoners.

However, as discussed above, equal protection concerns would require that a limited form of screening be used for fee-paid non-prisoner

cases. Such screening would not be required at the inception of an action
or appeal, but only if and when the merits of a particular action or appeal
were reviewed by the court in deciding a motion or for some other pur-

pose. Thus, this contingent form of screening could potentially take
place at any point in the litigation.98

3. Cases Filed by Prisoners
a. Prisoners and Equal Protection
The three PLRA dismissal provisions do not appear to violate the
equal protection rights of prisoner litigants. With regard to prisoners
proceeding informa pauperis,the Supreme Court's conclusion in Neitzke
that the § 1915 screening and dismissal procedures were justified-i.e.,
the "lack of economic incentive" rationale-would apply equally to the
97. See cases cited supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. The majority rule is
consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Neitzke that "[u]nder Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the
motion is ruled upon." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329. However, this sentence was followed
by a footnoted disclaimer: "We have no occasion to pass judgment, however, on the permissible scope, if any, of sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. at 329 n.8.
98. The equal protection concerns discussed in the text also can be resolved by
finding the PLRA screening mechanisms unconstitutional, at least in part. The proposed
limited screening of fee-paid cases, and dismissal of those which are frivolous or fail to
state a claim, would avoid such a result.
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screening procedures required by § 1915A and § 1997e(c). 99
The "lack of economic incentive" rationale, however, does not jus-

tify the screening of fee-paid prisoner actions and may not fully justify
the screening of prisoner actions in which the fee is paid in installments

pursuant to § 1915(b).100 In those instances, the screening mandated by
§ 1915A and § 1997e addresses the broader congressional concern that

prisoners in general tend to bring many meritless actions and is rationally
structured to accomplish the valid congressional purpose of reducing the

number of meritless actions filed by prisoners that governmental defendants need to defend.' 0 '

Additionally, any equal protection argument is further weakened if it

is concluded, as discussed above, that all fee-paid nonprisoner actions are
also subject to screening and possible dismissal whenever the merits of
the action are reviewed.

b. Cases Against Governmental Defendants or Brought with
Respect to Prison Conditions
i. § 1915A
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the federal courts to "review, before
docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after dock-

eting," all prisoner complaints seeking redress from governmental enti-

ties or officials and to dismiss those falling within the terms of
§ 1915A(b).' 0 2 However, there is some ambiguity as to the timing of the
99. See supra notes 36 and 76 and accompanying text. See also Greig v. Goord,
169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) ("When introducing the PLRA, Senators Dole and Kyl
justified treating prisoners differently from other litigants by stating that prisoners file
frivolous lawsuits because filing lawsuits 'has become a recreational activity for longterm residents of our prisons,' because prisoners 'have little to lose and everything to
gain,' and because filing frivolous complaints is 'a means of gaining a short sabbatical in
the nearest Federal courthouse.' ") (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S7524-26 (daily ed. May 25,
1995) (statements of Sens. Dole and Kyl)).
100. In cases where the initial filing fee installments paid by a prisoner pursuant to
§ 1915(b) are a substantial portion of the prisoner's assets, the prisoner's economic incentive to avoid filing a meritless action may be substantial even if the fee installments at
that point are only a fraction of the entire filing fee.
101. See legislative history cited supranotes 11, 24 and 36.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b) (Supp. 1111998).
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§ 1915A review and dismissal. While review is to occur, if feasible,
prior to "docketing," it is unclear what Congress understood "docketing"
to mean. As noted by the Second Circuit,
Apparently docketing practices are not uniform among
district courts. A docket is a court's official record of
what occurs in a case. It may be maintained either on
paper or electronically. In some courts, as soon as a
complaint is received, a "docket" is opened, meaning
that a paper or electronic record is begun on which all
subsequent actions occurring in the case will be recorded. The filing of the complaint is usually the first
entry on the docket. In other courts, however, pro se
complaints are given a preliminary screening prior to the
opening of a docket, and if a judge determines that the
complaint is frivolous, a docket is later opened in which
is simultaneously recorded the filing of the complaint,
the plaintiff's motion to proceed informa pauperis, and
the judge's order of dismissal.... Only in courts that
delay docketing until frivolousness has been determined
could the screening contemplated by section 1915A occur before docketing....
In any event, section 1915A requires screening before
docketing "if feasible," and appears not to interfere with
the practice of many courts to open a docket as soon as a
complaint is received and thereafter make a determination as to frivolousness. 0 3
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, it is evident that the intent of the
statute would be met as long as all applicable prisoner complaints are
reviewed, and the appropriate complaints dismissed, prior to service of
process. 1°4 Since the harm addressed by the statute, waste of judicial and

103. Leonardv. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1996).
104. See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05, 608-09 (6th Cir.
1997) (dictum) (stating that screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A is to be performed
prior to service of process); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir.
1997) (administrative order of Boyce F. Martin, Jr., C.J.) (same).
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governmental-defendant resources, commences only upon service on the
defendants, § 1915A review is appropriate any time before service would
normally be arranged.10 5

ii. § 1997e(c)
Of the prisoner cases that fall within § 1997e(c), i.e., those "brought
with respect to prison conditions," most will be against governmental
entities or officials. Those cases must be screened pursuant to § 1915A
and, if they survive that screening, remain subject to later screening and
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2). Prisoner cases that concern prison conditions but are not against governmental entities or officials are subject to
§ 1915(e)(2) screening. Thus, the timing of the10screening
of § 1997e(c)
6
cases will be controlled by § 1915 and § 1915A.
c.

Cases Not Against Governmental Defendants and Not
Brought with Respect to Prison Conditions

Section 1915A, by its terms, only applies to actions filed by prisoners against governmental defendants, and appears to authorize dismissal
of complaints only during the pre-docketing review period. 0 7 However,
even if a particular prisoner action does not, by reason of one or both of
these limitations, fall within the scope of § 1915A, it is still subject to
§ 1915(e)(2), which applies to all prisoner actions and permits dismissal
105. It is assumed that few judicial resources are expended between the time a
prisoner complaint is received by the court and issuance of process. If the procedures of
a particular court require substantial resources to be expended during this time period,
such courts should endeavor to review prisoner complaints at the earliest possible juncture to avoid needless processing.
106. This description of the relationship between the three PLRA dismissal provisions relies on the conclusion reached in Part I.B. that fee-paid prisoner actions are governed by the screening and dismissal provisions of § 1915(e). If that conclusion is rejected, then fee-paid prisoner cases that fall within § 1997e, but not within § 1915(e) or §
1915A, should be screened only at the same junctures as fee-paid nonprisoner actions.
107. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 608 ("Section 1915A is restricted to prisoners who
sue government entities, officers, or employees. In contrast, § 1915(e)(2) is restricted
neither to actions brought by prisoners, nor to cases involving government defendants.
Further, § 1915A is applicable at the initial stage of the litigation, while § 1915(e)(2) is
applicable throughout the entire litigation process."); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105
F.3d at 1134 (same).
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at any stage of the action.108
Similarly, prisoner actions which do not fall within § 1997e(c) still
must be screened under § 1915(e)."0 9
C. Opportunitiesto Amend Complaint
1. Notice of Possible Dismissal and Pre-Dismissal Opportunity to
Amend
Prior to the 1996 PLRA amendments, the Supreme Court noted in
Neitzke that a plaintiff seeking to proceed under § 1915(a) had no right to
prior notice that dismissal was being contemplated under § 1915(d) and

no right to amend the complaint prior to such a dismissal. 10
In the years since the PLRA amendments, the three circuits which
have addressed the issue have reached different results. The Sixth Circuit has held that, under § 1915(e), § 1915A(b), and (presumably) §
1997e(c), plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis and prisoners do not
have a right to receive either prior notice that the court was contemplating dismissal or an opportunity to amend."' Although the analysis lead-

108. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 608 ("Should the [prisoner] complaint contain any
allegations that do not fall within § 1915A, the district court must then examine the complaint under § 1915(e)(2).... A case that may not initially appear to meet § 1915(e)(2)
may be dismissed at a future date should it become apparent that the case satisfies this
section. Thus, in prisoner cases, the district court must first examine a com-plaint under
§ 1915A and then review the complaint under § 1915(e)(2) before the case may proceed
in due course."); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d at 1134 (same).
109. Part II.B.3.c. is subject to the same proviso as discussed in note 105, supra.
110. Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989).
111. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 612 (finding that PLRA superseded requirement of
Tingle v. Marshall,716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983), that district courts must give plaintiffs
an opportunity to amend or correct deficiencies in their complaints before sua sponte
dismissing); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d at 1138 (same). The McGore decision applies to all in forma pauperis litigants, prisoner and non-prisoner. See McGore,
114 F.3d at 608-09 (discussing indigent non-prisoners), 612 (discussing right to amend).
Although the discussion in McGore concerning notice and opportunity to amend only
mentions § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, that discussion is presumed to also encompass §
1997e(c) since the district court had dismissed under all three provisions and the circuit
court affirmed the district court judgment "in all respects." Id. at 604, 613. It is unclear
whether the district court in McGore dismissed the action as frivolous or for failure to
state a claim. See id. at 604, 612, 613. However, the rather expansive language in
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ing to this holding is not well-developed, the court apparently based
its holding on its determination that the PLRA dismissal provisions, unlike former § 1915(d), do not contain discretionary language which would allow a court to avoid dismissing an action
12
through the filing of an amended complaint.'
The position of the Second Circuit is less clear. In a case concerning
a dismissal under § 1915A for failure to state a claim, the court held that
"the statute clearly does not require that process be served or that the
13
plaintiff be provided an opportunity to respond before dismissal."'
However, in a case concerning dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim, a different Second Circuit panel of judges held
"that a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis should be
afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid plaintiff to amend his
complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless the
court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an
amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim."'1 14 It can be argued that the Second Circuit, sub silentio, intended dismissals for failure
to state a claim to be handled differently depending on which PLRA provision was involved; however, it appears more likely that the two panels,
which issued their decisions only twelve days115apart, were unaware that
the two cases concerned closely related issues.
McGore strongly suggests that both types of dismissal are covered by the decision. See
id.
The McGore decision suggests that the Sixth Circuit continued to require, even after
Neitzke, that the district courts, when contemplating dismissal of a pro se in forma pauperis complaint, first give the plaintiffnotice that dismissal was possible and an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the defect. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 612 (discussing
Tingler). The McGore decision renders moot any conflict between the pre-PLRA practice of the Sixth Circuit and Neitzke.
112. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 604, 612.
113. Carry. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999).
114. Gomez v. USAA Fed. Say. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999); accord
Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying on Gomez v. USAA).
115. It also can be argued that the language quoted from Gomez and Carr can be
reconciled by finding that although Carr states that § 1915A "does not require ... that
the plaintiff be provided an opportunity to respond before dismissal," Carr, 171 F.3d at
116 (emphasis added), such procedure "should' be followed unless the response (e.g.,
amendment) would be futile, Gomez, 171 F.3d at 796 (emphasis added). It appears unlikely that the two panels intended such a result, and, even if they did, that approach
should be rejected for the reasons discussed in the text.
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit has held that dismissal of a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim "is proper only
where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has
to amend."1 16
alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity
1 17
This holding, however, is unaccompanied by analysis.
For the reasons that follow, it is concluded that dismissals under §
1915(e), § 1915A(b), and § 1997e(c) need not be preceded by notice or
an opportunity to amend.
As discussed in Part llJ.A.3. of this article, the language of the PLRA
dismissal provisions do not offer unambiguous guidance as to how the
courts are to handle the dismissals encompassed by those provisions.
However, the PLRA's legislative history, in both its language and tone,
clearly indicates that Congress intended PLRA dismissals to be "immediate[]" and "prompt,"' 1 8 a result consistent with the pre-PLRA procedures described in Neitzke. Requiring pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend would run contrary to this clear congressional intent. To
the extent that there are various considerations that weigh in favor of
permitting amendment, those considerations are fully vindicated by the
district court dismissing with leave to amend, as discussed in the next
section of this article.
Aside from the possible conflict between Gomez and Carr, there is the additional
question of whether the panel deciding Gomez intended to hold, by implication, that dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim require more procedural
protections for the plaintiff than dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) on grounds of frivolousness. The Neitzke decision, which is not discussed in Gomez, clearly stated that predismissal notice and opportunity to amend did not apply to the latter dismissals. As discussed in the text, any such distinction should be rejected.
116. Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Perkins as holding that "a district court may grant leave
to amend when dismissing a complaint under the PLRA." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, while the language used in Perkins is
somewhat ambiguous, it appears to address pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to
amend, rather than dismissal with leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation
would support the conclusion reached in Part II.C.2. of this article, which addresses dismissal with leave to amend.
117. See Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806.
118. 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole) (stating that cases filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis that failed to
state a claim would be "immediately dismissed"); H.R. CoNF. REP. 104-378, 1995 WL
717401, at *348 (1995) (stating that § 1915A would "require early judicial screening and
prompt dismissal of clearly meritless suits").
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It is further noted that, on the issue of pre-dismissal notice and
amendment, no distinction should be drawn between the three PLRA
dismissal provisions or between claims that are frivolous and those that
fail to state a claim. The fact that the three PLRA dismissal provisions
contain identical grounds for dismissal and were enacted in the same
legislation by itself strongly suggests that the three dismissal provisions
19
should be interpreted in the same manner.'
Regarding the possible distinction between claims that are frivolous
versus those that fail to state a claim, litigants proceeding in forma pauperis prior to the PLRA had no right to pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend, and there is no indication Congress wished to abandon or
limit this principle when it added "failure to state a claim" to the grounds
for § 1915(e) dismissal. Quite to the contrary, in enacting the PLRA,
Congress clearly wished to further limit the rights of in forma pauperis
and prisoner litigants.
Thus, the courts should find that, under all three PLRA dismissal
provisions, and under all grounds for dismissal within those three provisions, pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend is not permitted.
2.

Dismissal with Leave to Amend

In Denton, the Supreme Court stated that a district court dismissing a
complaint under § 1915(d) was required to consider whether such dismissal should be without prejudice or with leave to amend.120 This requirement stemmed from the possible res judicata effect of a § 1915 determination that a complaint was frivolous.' 2' The Court apparently
wanted to ensure that litigants proceeding informapauperis would have
an opportunity to present their case if, in fact, they had a nonfrivolous
basis for the action which could only be revealed upon amendment.
After the 1996 amendments, at least one circuit panel, in the Ninth
Circuit, held that the district courts no longer have discretion to dismiss

119. See cases cited supra notes 8 and 12 (discussing rule of statutory interpretation). The legislative history does not distinguish between the three PLRA dismissal
provisions with regard to pre-dismissal notice and amendment. In fact, the subjects of
notice and amendment are not broached at all.
120. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,34 (1992).
121. See id.
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122
in fonna pauperis complaints under § 1915(e) with leave to amend.

The court based its decision primarily on the "mandatory" language in §

1915 (e), which states that complaints which are deficient under that provision "shall" be dismissed, and, to some extent, the legislative history of
the provision. 123 In an en banc decision, however, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel's decision and found that a district court did, in fact, retain its discretion "over the terms of a dismissal for failure to state a

claim, including whether to make the dismissal with or without leave to
amend." 124

122. See Lopez v. Smith, 160 F.3d 567, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing requirements set forth in Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1987), and finding
amendment right no longer applied to litigants covered by the PLRA); see also id. at 571
n.2 ("It goes without saying that for individuals who do not file informapauperis,'dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that
the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.' ") (quoting Schneider v. California
Dep't of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1998)); Watts v. Cambra, No. C 983328 SI (PR), 1999 WL 9923 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1999) (unpublished disposition)
(citing Lopez for proposition that § 1915(e)(2) requires outright dismissal of pauperprisoner's defective complaint, rather than with leave to amend).
The Lopez holding states that "pursuant to the PLRA, ... a court can no longer, at
its discretion, provide an opportunity for the pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding in forma
pauperis to amend deficiencies in his complaint." 160 F.3d at 571; accord id. at 570.
However, in a footnote, the court suggests that the holding applies to all in forma pauperis plaintiffs, not just prisoners. See id. at 571 n.2 ("The scope of this opinion obviously would be limited to suits filed by litigants proceeding informapauperis.").
123. See Lopez, 160 F.3d at 569-71. The Lopez decision also cites to the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in McGore. See id. at 570. However, McGore only addressed predismissal amendment. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997)
(discussing Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983)); In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d at 1138; Slate v. Traughber, No. 97-6307, 1998 WL 808258 (6th Cir.
Nov. 10, 1998) (unpublished table decision) ("we note that the district court properly
dismissed the complaint without allowing Slate to amend because ... § 1915(e)(2)(B)
overrules this court's decision in Tingler ... and permits a court to dismiss a suit at any
time without prior notice. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 612.").
124. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000), superseding Lopez v.
Smith, 160 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 1998). At times, the en banc majority appeared to be addressing an issue other than the one addressed by the original Lopez panel (and the en
banc dissent). The original panel and the en banc dissent seemed to be addressing predismissal notice and opportunity to amend, not whether a dismissal can be with leave to
amend. The original panel stated that it was affirming the district court "[d]espite the
district court's failure to give Lopez notice and an opportunity to amend" and discussed
prior Ninth Circuit case law which "required a district court to provide a pro se litigant
with certain procedural protections prior to dismissal of a complaint." Lopez, 160 F.3d at
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For a variety of reasons, it is concluded that the courts retain the dis-

cretion to dismiss with leave to amend under the PLRA dismissal provisions: (1) neither the language of the PLRA dismissal provisions nor the
legislative history forbids dismissal with leave to amend; (2) the Supreme Courts reasons, in Denton, for finding that the district courts had
such discretion have not been repudiated, even by implication, by the

PLRA or its legislative history; (3) forbidding amendment would promote inefficiency and unfairness, contrary to the congressional intent
behind the PLRA; and (4) forbidding amendment may run afoul of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
First, even if the three PLRA dismissal provisions are interpreted as

now rigidly mandating, rather than permitting, dismissal of complaints
that are frivolous, complaints that fail to state a claim, and complaints
against immune parties, neither the PLRA dismissal provisions themselves nor the legislative history addresses, even by implication, whether

such dismissals may be with leave to amend.
The legislative history makes clear that Congress wanted to reduce

the number of meritless federal court lawsuits by requiring prisoners to
569, 570. The en bane dissent concluded that "there is nothing [in the text of the PLRA]
that suggests that a district court must provide the pro se prisoner-litigant an opportunity
to amend a faulty complaint prior to such mandatory dismissals." Lopez, 203 F.3d at
1139. However, since the en bane majority's holding clearly concerned only the district
court's discretion to make a dismissal with or without leave to amend, that description of
the issue will be deemed controlling. See id. at 1124, 1130. But see Miller v. State, No.
97-35433, 2000 WL 249258 at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000) (unpublished table decision)
(suggesting Lopez en bane decision might normally require pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend unless amendment would be futile); Ford v. Fletes, No. 98-15792,
2000 WL 249124 at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (citing Lopez en bane decision as requiring pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend).
In Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2000), the court held that when dismissing, on motion, a fee-paid action encompassed by § 1997e(c)(1) for failure to state a
claim, the district court should grant leave to amend unless certain exceptions apply. Id.
at 114, 117. At least two other circuit opinions can be read as suggesting that dismissals
under § 1915A or § 1997e(c) for failure to state a claim should be with leave to amend
unless amendment would be futile. See Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342,
1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(§ 1915A); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.
1998)(§ 1997e(c)). However, neither court focused on the possibility that the PLRA had
overruled, by implication, prior case law requiring that leave to amend be given in most
cases. Moreover, since the courts found that amendment would have been futile, a ruling
on the right to amend was not necessary to the disposition of the cases. See Davis at
1349; see also Bazrowx at 1054.
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125
pay the filing fee, whenever possible, and requiring the "prompt dis-

missal of clearly meritless" lawsuits. 126 The legislative history indicates

that the PLRA targeted prisoner lawsuits which were "completely without merit" and was not intended "to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims., 127 One sponsor stated that the PLRA "will allow meritorious claims to be filed, but gives the judge broader discretion to prevent
128 Another
frivolous and malicious lawsuits filed by prison inmates.

sponsor stated that the intention 1of29the PLRA was to put prisoners on an
equal footing with non-prisoners.
The examples of meritless lawsuits given in the legislative history

also suggest that Congress was concerned with complaints that should

never have been filed in the first instance, not complaints which could
3
Thus, for
state a valid claim if the plaintiff were permitted to amend.

example, a complaint which alleged that the plaintiff was maliciously

125. See sources cited supra note 36.
126. H.R. CoNF. REP. 104-378, 1995 WL 717401, at *348 (1995) ("Section 805
[of PLRA] adds a new section 1915A to 28 U.S.C. to require early judicial screening and
prompt dismissal of clearly meritless suits against governmental entities or employees.")
(emphasis added).
127. 141 CONG. REc. S14611-01, S14626-27 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (comments
of Sen. Hatch) ("I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This
legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised. The legislation will, however,
go far in preventing inmates from abusing the Federal judicial system."); accord, id. at
S146628 (comments of Sen. Reid) ("If [prisoners] have a meritorious lawsuit, of course
they should be able to file.").
128. 141 CONG. REc. S14611-01, S14628 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (comments of
Sen. Thurmond).
129. 141 CoNG. REc. S14611-01, S14629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (comments of
Sen. Kyl) ("All we are doing is asking [prisoners to] pay the same kind of filing fees and
costs that a citizen who has not committed any violation of law has to pay, and that their
suits be subject to the same kind of requirements in terms of meeting the tests of a legitimate lawsuit rather than just being a frivolous lawsuit.... You do not have extra privileges when you go to prison. You certainly ought not to be treated any better than the
average citizen.").
130. See 142 CONG. REC. S3703 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (comments of Sen.
Abraham) (examples of nonmeritorious suits); 141 CoNG. REC. S7524, S7524 (daily ed.
May 25, 1995) (comments of Sen. Dole) (same); 141 CoNG. REc. S14408-01, S14413
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (comments of Sen. Dole) (same); id. at S14418 (comments of
Sen. Kyl) (same); 141 CONG. REc. S14611-01, S14627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (comments of Sen. Hatch) (giving examples of frivolous prisoner lawsuits); id. at S14627-28
(comments of Sen. Reid) (same); id. at S14629 ("Top 10" lists of frivolous inmate lawsuits in Arizona and nationally).

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol, 43

beaten by state officials, but which failed to name the correct defendants,
may be subject to dismissal under one or more of the PLRA dismissal
provisions, but it is unlikely that Congress intended to bar the plaintiff
from curing the deficiencies. 3
Second, the Supreme Court's holding in Denton that the district
courts were required to consider whether § 1915 dismissals should be
with leave to amend was not based on the discretionary language then
found in § 1915(d). Rather, that holding was based on the possible res
judicata effect § 1915 dismissals might have on later complaints filed
132

under § 1915(a).

There is no suggestion that the res judicata effect of

a dismissal under the current version of § 1915 is any different than the

res judicata effect of a dismissal under the pre-1996 version. Thus, the
res judicata-based rationale for dismissing with leave to amend, when
amendment would not be futile, still applies.1 33

Third, dismissing a potentially viable complaint without leave to

amend will lead to both inefficiency and unfairness. Some plaintiffs will

persevere and commence a new law suit-in the hope that a new complaint will cure the deficiencies of the prior complaint. This round-about
way of amending will result in additional work for the plaintiff, the court,
and, possible, the defendants. Those who fail to refile will forfeit any
opportunity to obtain judicial consideration of potentially viable claims.
In fact, some plaintiffs with potentially viable claims may be unable to
131. See supra note 115. The Ninth Circuit, en banc, also noted that there was no
indication that Congress wished to penalize non-prisoners proceeding informa pauperis
by forbidding dismissals under 1915(e), which covers both prisoners and non-prisoners,
to be with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129.
132. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). Although the Supreme
Court found the district court's exercise of discretion relevant to whether a subsequent
fee-paid complaint could be filed and to whether leave to amend should be granted, it was
not the reason given by the Supreme Court for requiring the district courts to consider
dismissing with leave to amend. See id.
133. The en banc dissent in Lopez states that the Supreme Court found in Neitzke
that § 1915 does not provide for the procedural protection encompassed by the leave to
amend provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 113839 (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 330). However, at the cited portion of Neitzke the Supreme Court was discussing pre-dismissal notice and opportunity to amend. See Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 329-30. The Denton decision, on the other hand, discusses the ability of the
district courts to dismiss under § 1915(d) with leave to amend and clearly indicates that a
district court would have abused its discretion if it failed to grant such leave in an appropriate case. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34.
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file a new complaint either through ignorance or the existence of some
impediment, such as a statute of limitations, res judicata, or the "three

strikes" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Although erecting a noamendment hurdle may, overall, reduce the burden on the courts, it is

unclear why plaintiffs with potentially valid claims should be deterred in
such a fashion.
Finally, barring the district court from dismissing with leave to
amend may violate equal protection and due process as there may not be
a rational basis134 for (a) treating complaints which may have merit if
amendment were allowed in the same fashion as irreparably meritless
complaints; and (b) treating prisoners' and in forma pauperis plaintiffs'

curable complaints differently than fee-paid non-prisoners' curable complaints. 135 The legitimate interest of Congress in clearing federal court

dockets of non-viable prisoner complaints does not justify the dismissal,

without leave to amend, of in forma pauperis complaints filed by non-

prisonerswhich may be viable if amendment were permitted, and probacomplaints which may be
bly does not justify the dismissal of1prisoner
36
permitted.
were
viable if amendment

134. The rational basis test is satisfied "if there is a rational relationship between
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The disparate treatment will be upheld "'if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'" Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
Statutory classifications "bear[] a strong presumption of validity ... and those attacking
the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.'" Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))(citations omitted).
135. As noted earlier, the circuit courts which have found that the PLRA prisoner
filing fee provisions, and the PLRA bar on certain mental or emotional injury claims, did
not violate equal protection used the rational basis test. See cases cited supra note 77.
As of yet, no circuit has examined the possible equal protection ramifications of dismissals with or without leave to amend. For purposes of this article, it is assumed that the
rational basis test applies to the leave-to-amend issue as well. Of course, if the provision
is deficient under the rational basis test, it also would be deficient under the strict scrutiny
test.
136. The factors leading various courts to find that the PLRA fee provisions did
not violate equal protection do not apply to the amendment issue. The PLRA fee provisions and the bar on mental or emotional injury claims distinguish between prisoners and
non-prisoners, and the circuit courts found those distinctions rational based on the differences between prisoner and non-prisoner litigants. See Davis v. District of Columbia,
158 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (D.C.
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In light of the above-noted difficulties with a no-amendment rule,

and the lack of any statutory language or legislative history requiring

such a rule, it is recommended that the district courts continue to exercise
broad discretion in determining whether dismissal should be with or
37
without leave to amend.1
Im.

APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Although some courts have applied a single appellate standard of review to each of the PLRA dismissal provisions, without distinguishin
between the various grounds for dismissal in each of those provisions, 131

Cir. 1998); Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1998); Zehner v. Trigg, 133
F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19-21 (2d Cir. 1997);
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d
227, 230-31, 233-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (6th
Cir. 1997). However, § 1915(e) does not distinguish between those two groups-both
groups of litigants are subject to dismissal on the same grounds.
137. The discussion in Part I.B. of this article concerns instances where only a
complaint is before the court and, in performing the screening required by the PLRA, the
court must determine whether the plaintiff will be permitted to file an amended complaint. It does not cover instances where the plaintiff has filed an amended complaint
prior to screening. In the latter instances, a pragmatic approach should be taken. Neither
the statute nor the legislative history address the issue of what the district court should do
under the PLRA screening and dismissal provisions when both a complaint and an
amended complaint are filed prior to the time the screening occurs. The only guidance
given is that a complaint that falls within the dismissal provisions be dismissed "immediately". See 141 CONG. REc. S14408-01 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995). But if the amended
complaint by itself, or the amended complaint read in conjunction with the original complaint, does not fall within the dismissal provisions, it seems logical to allow the action to
proceed. The point of the PLRA screening and dismissal provisions is to quickly identify
and dismiss clearly meritless actions in order to conserve the resources of the courts and
defendants. X when screening the original complaint, the court could not consider an
amended complaint which cured the defects of the original complaint, the procedure
would likely expend more of the court's resources (and perhaps the defendants' as well)
and would result in the dismissal of actions that were not clearly meritless. This result
would clearly be contrary to the intent of Congress.
138. See, e.g., Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that de novo standard applies to § 1915A dismissals); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132,
134 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that de novo standard applies to § 1915A and § 1997e(c)(2)
dismissals). But see Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting different standards of review might apply; reviewing § 1915A(b)(2) dismissal for
failure to state a claim); Watson v. Dorsey, 215 F.3d 1338, 2000 WL 228299 at *1 (10th
Cir. 2000) (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissal reviewed for abuse of discretion while §
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the following discussion will focus separately on frivolousness, failure to
state a claim and immunity dismissals.
A. Dismissalas Frivolous
1. The Standard Prior to the 1996 Amendments

The Supreme Court's opinion in Denton v. Hernandez39 has consistently been cited as establishing that, pre-PLRA, a district court's dismissal of a complaint as frivolous under § 1915(d) was to be reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. 140 However, it is not clear that Denton should
be read as covering dismissals of both factually frivolous complaints and

legally frivolous complaints. In defining the issues to be decided in
Denton, the Supreme Court stated the following:
In Neitzke v. Williams, we considered the standard to be
applied when determining whether the legal basis of an
in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous under
§ 1915(d). The issues in this case are the appropriate inquiry for determining when an in forma pauperis litigant's factual allegations justify a § 1915(d) dismissal
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal reviewed de novo); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th
1999) (noting that, under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), dismissals for frivolousness
are reviewed for abuse of discretion while dismissals for failure to state a claim are reviewed de novo). The Fifth Circuit's decisions in Ruiz and Berry concerning the standard
of review for § 1915A dismissals are in apparent conflict. Ruiz appears to hold that all
such dismissals are reviewed de novo while Berry distinguishes § 1915(A) dismissals for
frivolousness, which it states are reviewed for abuse of discretion, from § 1915A dismissals for failure to state a claim, which it states are reviewed de novo. The Ruiz decision makes the unexplained observation that § 1915A, unlike § 1915, "does not distinguish between dismissals as frivolous and dismissals for failure to state a claim." Ruiz,
160 F.3d at 274. Of course, the fact that those two grounds for dismissal are separately
listed in the statute appears to indicate that Congress recognized a distinction between the
two.
139. 504 U.S. 25 (1992).
140. See, e.g., Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 436-37 (2d
Cir. 1998) (noting abuse of discretion standard was used for § 1915(d) dismissals prior to
1996 amendments, and citing Denton, 504 U.S. at 33); Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d
777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We review the § 1915(d) dismissal of this action for abuse of
discretion") (citing Denton, 504 U.S. at 33).
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for frivolousness, and the proper standard of appellate
review of such a dismissal.1 1
The Court also stated that its grant of certiorari was for the purpose
of "consider[ing] when an informa pauperis claim may be dismissed as
factually frivolous under § 1915(d).' 42 On the other hand, the Court
defined the applicable standard of review by using language that seemed
to include all § 1915(d) dismissals, 143 and stated that one of the factors to
be considered when determining whether the district court abused its discretion was "whether the court applied erroneous legal conclusions.' 44
However, immediately after setting forth this broad language, the Court
then reverted to discussing frivolous factual allegations without any suggestion that the breadth of the discussion had changed. 45
In any event, the possibility that the abuse of discretion standard announced in Denton was not intended to apply to determinations that a
complaint was legally frivolous does not call into question any pre-1996
district court or court of appeals decisions. Use of that standard to review legal frivolousness determinations would have had the same result
as use of the de novo standard, since "[a] district court by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.... The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not
guided by erroneous legal conclusions.' 4 6

141.
142.
143.

Denton, 504 U.S. at 27.
Id. at31.
See id. at 33 ("we further hold that a § 1915(d) dismissal is properly reviewed

for an abuse of that discretion").
144. Id. at 34.

145. See id.
146. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (discussing sentencing

guidelines departure standard of review) (also stating: "Little turns, however, on whether
we label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of
discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction.');
accord Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997) (discussing standard for reviewing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) decision; "[T]he [trial court's] exercise of discretion cannot be permitted to stand if we find it rests upon a legal principle that can no
longer be sustained."); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 341-42 (1996) (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., concurring) (discussing standard for
reviewing habeas corpus abuse of writ ruling; " 'It is a paradigmatic abuse of discretion
for a court to base its judgment on an erroneous view of the law' ") (quoting Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 333 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding no need to decide
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The Standard Currently Being Used

The changes made to the frivolousness provisions of § 1915 by the
1996 PLRA amendments raise the possibility that the appellate review
standard has also changed. At least one circuit, the Sixth, has decided
Tenth Cirthat the standard is now de novo, 147 while the Fifth, Ninth and
1 48
cuits have continued using the abuse of discretion standard.
standard of review since legal error would constitute abuse of discretion); Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (discussing standard for review of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 determination); LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748,
757 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing standard for reviewing denial of attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) and 3613(c)(2)); Broyhill Furniture Indus. v. Craftmaster Furniture
Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing standard for reviewing Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ruling); Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716,
727-28 (10th Cir. 1993)(same).
147. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997); see also
Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6t" Cir. 2000) (citing McGore); Brown v. Bargery,
207 F.3d 863, 866 (6 h Cir. 2000) (same); Jones v. Voinovich, 168 F.3d 489, 1998 WL
808248, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (same); Cumpian v. Nye, 168
F.3d 489, 1998 WL 791732, at *1 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (same);
Scarborough v. Beeler, 168 F.3d 490, 1998 WL 791833, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (same).
148. The Fifth Circuit has published several opinions stating the standard of review for a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507
(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998)); Harper v.
Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Siglar v. Hightower,
112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997), and noting that Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236
(5th Cir. 1999), had incorrectly used de novo standard for § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) dismissal));
Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998)(citing Siglar)); Gonzales v.
Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998)(same); Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734
(5th Cir. 1998) (same); cf Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211,213 (5th Cir. 1998) (using abuse
of discretion standard, but not indicating whether dismissal was under old or new version
of § 1915). Although some have cited Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir.
1997), for the same proposition, see, e.g., Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d
546, 547 (7th Cir. 1997), that appeal concerned a dismissal under the old § 1915(d). See
Norton, 122 F.3d at 291.
The Ninth Circuit decisions are thus far unpublished. See Fenstermaker v. Carey,
152 F.3d 925, 1998 WL 382812, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision);
McDaniels v. Los Angeles County, 145 F.3d 1339, 1998 WL 321740, at *1 (9th Cir.
1998) (unpublished table decision); Hoke v. Symington, 92 F.3d 1192, 1996 WL 441685,
at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Singleton v. Torras, 92 F.3d 1194,
1996 WL 442235, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). In Peabody v.
Ziaket, 194 F.3d 1317, 1999 WL 731360, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), the court applied de novo review to a dismissal under "§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)," but
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Prior to the 1996 amendments, the portion of § 1915 which authorized the dismissal of fivolous cases stated that the courts "may dismiss
the case ... if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."'149 In
Denton, the Supreme Court, focusing on the word "satisfied" (and, perhaps, the word "may" as well), found that the frivolousness determination was entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the informa

pauperisrequest. Consequently, the court held that such decisions were
reviewed for abuse of that discretion. 50

The 1996 amendments changed the applicable provision to state that

"the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
... the action or appeal ... is frivolous or malicious."'' 1 As a result of
this change, the Sixth Circuit, in McGore v. Wrigglesworth,152 found that

the discretionary language previously found in § 1915(d) had been eliminated, and concluded that the appellate review standard had changed
53
from abuse of discretion to de novo.

cited to a case which concerned review of a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See
Peabody,1999 WL 731360, at *1 (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999)).
The Tenth Circuit opinions are likewise unpublished. See, e.g., Watson v. Dorsey,
215 F.3d 1338, 2000 WL 228299 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Shelton
v. Seay, 202 F.3d 282, 1999 WL 1101254 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
At least two other circuits have noted the issue but found no need to address it at that
time. See Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998);
Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547. In both cases, the courts found that the same result would be
reached under either standard.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1995). See note 3, supra,for text of§ 1915(d).
150. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 ("the statute's instruction that an action may be
dismissed if the court is 'satisfied' that it is frivolous indicates that frivolousness is a
decision entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the informa pauperispetition... Because the frivolousness determination is a discretionary one, we further hold that
a § 1915(d) dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion.").
151. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
152. 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
153. See McGore, 114 F.3d at 604. Although McGore thus far has been universally cited as finding that a de novo standard now applies, this reading of McGore is open
to challenge. The McGore decision, after noting the reasoning in Denton that led the
Supreme Court to conclude that an abuse of discretion standard applied, and the fact that
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), as amended, did not contain "discretionary" language,
stated the following:
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Although the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits continue to use the
abuse of discretion standard, none of the relevant opinions contain any

analysis of the changes in § 1915. Moreover, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
cases all rely on prior circuit case law which predates the PLRA.

s4

As this court must now ascertain whether the district court properly
dismissed the complaint in compliance with § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A, we conclude that our determination involves a question of
law which requires de novo review. See United States v. Khalife, 106
F.3d 1300, 1302 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id. Since the cited portion of the Khalife decision concerns the standard of review for a
district court's interpretation of a statute, it is possible to argue that the McGore decision
is presenting the standard for interpretation of the meaning of § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A
rather than the standard for reviewing actions taken pursuant to those statutes. In fact, the
MeGore decision then proceeds to interpret the meaning of § 1915 at length. However,
every decision which has cited to McGore, including several Sixth Circuit decisions, has
interpreted the above language as establishing the standard for reviewing district court
action, not district court interpretation. See cases cited supra note 147; see also, e.g.,
Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. Moreover, the relevant paragraph begins, "We must first
determine our standard of review when a district court dismisses a complaint under
§ 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A(b)." McGore, 114 F.3d at 604. Thus, it appears that Khalife was
simply an unfortunate choice of authority.
154. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Graves v.
Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1993)). Fifth Circuit cases relying on Siglar include:
Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998); Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d

1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Black v.
Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998). See also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507
(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998) (mentioning
Siglar, but citing Denton for standard)); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing Denton and Davis); Humphries v. Various Fed. U.S. INS Employees, 164
F.3d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1997) (citing Graves)).

The Ninth Circuit cases include: Fenstermaker v. Carey, 152 F.3d 925, 1998 WL
382812, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (citing Trimble v. City of
Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 1995)); McDaniels v. Los Angeles County, 145
F.3d 1339, 1998 WL 321740 at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Hoke v. Symington, 92 F.3d
1192, 1996 WL 441685 at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (same) (citing Trimble and Denton, 504
U.S. at 33); Singleton v. Torras, 92 F.3d 1194, 1996 WL 442235 at *1 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same) (citing Denton). The one Ninth Circuit decision which uses a de novo standard is
deemed anomalous since it contains no analysis, does not mention any of the Ninth Circuit decisions which use the abuse of discretion standard, and cites to a case which applied the de novo standard to a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Peabody v.
Zlaket, 194 F.3d 1317, 1999 WL 731360, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
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Thus, the issue posed by the new statutory language, whether it requires
a different standard of review, has not been addressed by those courts.
The Tenth Circuit cases are similar to those from the Fifth and Ninth
55
Circuits: all of the Tenth Circuit cases rely on Schlicher v. Thomas,
which involved a dismissal under the pre-1996 version of § 1915(d).' 56
Moreover, the one Tenth Circuit decision which notes the change in
§ 1915(e)'s language, Basham v. Uphoff, 57 strongly suggests that the
circuit's use of the abuse of discretion standard may be abandoned.
In Basham, the Tenth Circuit stated that the district court's frivo58
lousness determination is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
However, after this statement is made in the text, a footnote appears
which questions the continued vitality of the abuse of discretion standard
and concludes that "a determination of frivolousness may now be subject
to de novo review, with the district court given discretion to refuse to
accept without question the truth of plaintiffs allegations that are
'clearly baseless,' which encompass 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' 'delusional,'
'wholly incredible,' or 'irrational' claims." 159
In light of the above-noted footnote in Basham, it is unclear why the
court used the abuse of discretion standard. Since Schlicher concerned
the pre-1996 version of § 1915, the court was no longer bound to follow
it. However, the court may have decided that there was no need to reach
the issue in that action since, according to the same footnote, the same
155. 111F.3d777,779(10thCir. 1997).
156. See id.at 779 & n.2. The cases citing to Schlicherinclude: Watson v. Dorsey,
215 F.3d 1338, 2000 WL 228299, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 29, 2000) (unpublished table decision); Basham v. Uphoff,No. 98-8013, 1998 WL 847689, at *4 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1998)
(unpublished order and judgment); Lynn v. Dubowski, 162 F.3d 1173, 1998 WL 732805,
at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d
573, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1997). Several cases cite to McWilliams, which itself cites to
Schlicher: Wright v. McCotter, 202 F.3d 284, 2000 WL 14423, at *2 (10th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision); Robinson v. Gibson, 201 F.3d 448, 1999 WL 1009497, at
*1 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Blum v. FederalBureau of Prisons,189 F.3d 477, 1999 WL
638232, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Lampley v. United States, 188 F.3d 518, 1999
WL 506526, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). One Tenth Circuit opinion cites to both
McWilliams and Harperv. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999): Jackson v.
Ward, 185 F.3d 874, 1999 WL 498491, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
157. 1998 WL 847689, at *4 n.2.
158. See id. at 4.
159. Id.at *4 n.2.

1999-20001

DISMISSAL OF FEDERAL ACTIONS

1027

160
result would have been reached under either standard of review.

3.

Recommended Standard of Review

For the following reasons, it is suggested that the abuse of discretion
standard of appellate review be used for all frivolousness-based PLRA
dismissals. Under that standard, the appellate courts should (a) accord
broad deference to both the district court's determination that a complaint is factually frivolous and its determination of whether dismissal
should be with leave to amend; and (b) review determinations that a
complaint is legally frivolous, and all other questions of law, in the same
manner as de novo review.
Contrary to the suggestion of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, the
amended language of § 1915(e) does not require the use of a de novo
standard. The change in terminology from "satisfied" to "determines"
and from "may" to "shall," is, at best, only ambiguous evidence of a
change in standard.
To the extent that the Supreme Court focused on "satisfied" in finding that the abuse of discretion standard applied to pre-1996 § 1915(d),
the substitution of "determines" for the word "satisfied" does not unambiguously suggest that discretion was being removed from the district
courts. Although the substitution of the word "shall" for "may" does
suggest a reduction or removal of discretion, it only applies to the actual
dismissal and not to the determination of whether a complaint is frivolous. This conclusion finds support in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp.,161 where the Supreme Court held that sanctions determinations
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 should be reviewed for abuse
of discretion. 162 The Court stated that the fact that sanctions "shall" be
imposed when a violation of Rule 11 was found did not "have any bearing on how to review the question whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11.,,163 Likewise, the fact that a frivolous complaint "shall" be

160. See id. The fact that the result would not have differed under the de novo
standard may have also led the court not to have the opinion published. Under Tenth
Circuit rules, citation to such unpublished decisions is "unfavored." See id. at n.*; 10TH
CiR. R. 36.3.

161.

496 U.S. 384 (1990).

162.
163.

See id. at 405.
Id. at404.
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dismissed does not have any bearing on how to review whether the complaint was frivolous in the first instance.
This analysis is consistent with the text of § 1997e(c). Although §
1997e(c) states that the court "shall" dismiss, the dismissal is required
only if the court is "satisfied" the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim, or seeks damages from an immune defendant. 164 As noted
above, the Supreme Court found that use of the word "satisfied" indicated that the courts retained discretion over such dismissals and, conesquently, abuse of discretion was the appropriate standard of review. 165
Section 1997e(c) thus can be construed as permitting the courts to use
their discretion in determining whether actions were frivolous or otherwise subject to 166
dismissal but requiringdismissal once such a determination was made.
The legislative history adds little to this analysis as it offers no explanation at all for the change in language and does not mention the appellate standard of review. However, as noted earlier, one PLRA sponsor stated that the PLRA amendments were intended to give judges
"broader discretion" to prevent meritless prisoner actions from proceeding.167 This language is certainly consistent with continued use of an
abuse of discretion standard.
In any event, the realities of the frivolousness determination, both
before and after the 1996 amendments, render the difference between
"may" and "shall" meaningless and strongly indicate that the district
courts do retain a large degree of discretion in some respects, but little
discretion in others.
First, it is clear that, both before and after the 1996 amendments, the
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
165. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33.
166. Unlike § 1997e(c), § 1915(e) and § 1915A(c) do not contain the term "satisfied," which signals the existence of discretionary authority. However, this distinction is
of no great moment (i.e., it does not mean that the courts have discretion under §
1997e(c), but not under § 1915(e) or 1915A(c)). The language of § 1915(e) and §
1915A(c) only requires that frivolous and other meritless actions be dismissed. It does
not explain how the courts should go about deciding whether a particular action is frivolous or otherwise meritless. As noted in the text, it is that part of the screening process
that requires the courts to use their discretion. The absence of any statutory guidance in §
1915(e) and § 1915A(c) concerning that part of the screening process cannot, by itself, be
interpreted as either forbidding or requiring the use of discretion.
167. See supranote 127.
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district courts were and are required to dismiss any complaint that is irreparably frivolous. In other words, despite the substitution of "shall"
for "may," nothing has changed in those situations where a court has
concluded that a complaint is irreparably frivolous: it must dismiss-it
lacks, and has always lacked, discretion to do otherwise. Thus, the language of § 1915 may have been changed simply so that the statute was
consistent with the actual practice of the district courts.
Second, the considerations that required the district courts to be
given wide discretion before the 1996 amendments still apply, despite
the 1996 changes. Specifically, when a complaint is factually suspect,
the district court must determine (a) whether some or all of the allegations are factually frivolous; and (b) whether any or all of the factually
frivolous allegations can be "cured" through the filing of an amended
complaint or other means. These fact-based issues require an exercise of
discretion since: (1) the district judge may be faced with factual allegations that do not fall squarely within prior case law or prior experience;
(2) the credibility of the allegations may depend on the judge's assessment of the individual litigants involved in that particular action; and (3)
the specific tools to be used to "cure" a particular complaint will depend
on the unique circumstances of the action. In making these determinations, the district judge must marshal all available information concerning the action and the plaintiff, whether or not that information appears
in the record or is subject to judicial notice.
Because these determinations are fact-reliant and the district court is
uniquely positioned to marshal the facts and make credibility determinations, 168 considerable discretion should be accorded its frivolousness determination concerning factual allegations. 169 Similar considerations led
168. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402 ("Familiar with the issues and litigants,
the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts
and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11."); id. at 404 ("The
district court is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 1l's goal of specific and
general deterrence. Deference to the determinations of courts on the front lines of litigation will enhance these courts' ability to control the litigants before them. Such deference will streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of
reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court.").
169. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact ...shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
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the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 170 Cooter & Gell, and
Pierce v. Underwood 71 to hold that the abuse of discretion standard
should be used in reviewing Sentencing Guidelines departures, Rule 11
sanction decisions, and attorneys' fees decisions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d).' 72 In all three situations, it was felt that "only deferential review gave the district court the necessary flexibility to resolve questions
involving 'multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist
generalization.' ,,173 The Denton decision is consistent with this analysis;
in that case, the Supreme Court declined to define the factual frivolousness standard with "more precision" and stated that the district courts
were "in the best position to determine which cases fell into [that] category." 174 Neither the statutory changes nor the legislative history suggest
that these considerations were rejected or even addressed by Congress.
Third, the statutory language changes are irrelevant to how legally
frivolous allegations were or are handled. As noted above, both the
abuse of discretion standard and the de novo standard should yield the
same result when a determination of law is reviewed. 175 Thus, both before and after the 1996 amendments, the district courts were and are accorded little, if any, discretion
in determining whether an allegation has
176
any arguable basis in law.
In light of the above factors, and the lack of any unambiguous suggestion that Congress intended otherwise, it is recommended that the
170. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
171. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
172. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-100; Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402-05; Pierce,
487 U.S. at 559-62.
173. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62); accord
Koon, 518 U.S. at 99 (quoting Cooter & Gell and Pierce).
174. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,33 (1992).
175. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
176. When determining whether an allegation lacks an arguable basis in law, the
court making the frivolousness determination should assume that the facts alleged are
true (unless they are factually frivolous). Thus, the "no arguable basis in law" frivolousness determination is similar, although not identical, to a determination under Rule
12(b)(6) that the complaint fails to state a claim. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326, 328 (1989) (noting considerable overlap between § 1915(d) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards); see also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Since the Rule 12(b)(6) determination is solely a matter of law, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326, it is subject to de novo
review on appeal. See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996); Sykes v. James, 13
F.3d 515, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1993); see also infraPart III.B.
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abuse of discretion standard be used for77frivolousness determinations
under § 1915(e), § 1915A and § 1997e(c).
B. DismissalforFailureto State a Claim
As previously noted, by adding subsection (e)(2)(B)(ii) to § 1915,
and including similar language in § 1915A(b) and § 1997e(c), Congress
apparently intended to give district courts the authority to dismiss, at an
earlier juncture, on the same grounds as previously only permitted by
Thus, as with Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, dismissals unRule 12(b)(6).
1997e(c) for failure to state a
der § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b),
179 or §
novo.
de
reviewed
be
should
claim

177. Of course, the de novo standard would be appropriate when reviewing a district court's interpretation of one of the PLRA dismissal provisions itself. For example, a
district court's legal conclusion that § 1915 permitted the dismissal of both fee-paid and
in forma pauperis complaints, or that the PLRA amendments applied retroactively, or
that "frivolous" should be defined in a particular way would be reviewed de novo. See,
e.g., Rowsey v. Swinson, 156 F.3d 1244, 1998 WL 482800, at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (fee-paid complaints encompassed by § 1915(e)); Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1997) (§ 1915(e)(2) applies to cases pending
prior to enactment of PLRA amendments).
178. See cases cited supranote 12 and accompanying text.
179. The following cases hold that a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo: DeWalt v. Carter,224 F.3d 607, 611-12 (7t' Cir. 2000); Moore v. Sims,

200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir. 2000); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999); Harperv. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999); Perkinsv. Kansas
Dep't ofCorrections,165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999); Barren v. Harrington,152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999); Black v. Warren, 134

F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1998); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604 ("dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under either § 1915(e)(2) or
§ 1915A(b), is still subject to our traditional de novo standard"); Mitchell, 112 F.3d at
1490;,Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996).
The following cases hold that a dismissal under § 1915A for failure to state a claim
is reviewed de novo: Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000); Resnick v.

Hayes, 200 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 2000); Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 626-27 (7th
Cir. 1999); Smith v. Scully, 194 F.3d 1318, 1999 WL 719515, at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Cooperv. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999); Peltierv.
FederalBureau of Prisons, 185 F.3d 874, 1999 WL 546011, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Haddock v. RJW Inc., 173 F.3d 863, 1999 WL 160847 at *2
(10th Cir. 1999) (same).
The following cases hold that the de novo standard is to be used to review dismissals
under § 1997e(c) for failure to state a claim: Barnes v. Hawk, 166 F.3d 346, 1998 WL
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C. Dismissal on Immunity Grounds
District court decisions concerning the sovereign immunity of the
United States, individual states, and other sovereign entities have long
been reviewed de novo as determinations of law.180 Likewise, district
court decisions concerning the absolute or qualified immunity of indi-

883307, at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (holding that § 1997e(c) dismissal for failure to state a claim to be reviewed de novo and noting in dictum that de
novo standard applies to Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals); Bazrowx v.
Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 156 (1998).
180. The issue of whether sovereign immunity bars a claim against the United
States has been held to be an issue of law requiring de novo review. See, e.g., Koehler v.
United States, 153 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. $515,060.42, 152 F.3d
491, 504 (6th Cir. 1998); Research Triangle Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 132 F.3d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1997); Mesa v. United States, 1323 F.3d 1435, 1437
(11th Cir. 1997); Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1997); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Frankwell Bullion, Ltd., 99 F.3d 299, 305 (9th Cir. 1996);
Weaver v. United States, 98 F.3d 518, 519-20 (10th Cir. 1996); Bailor v. Salvation Army,
51 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 1995); Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.
1995). But see Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996)(treating sovereign
immunity of United States as subject matter jurisdiction issue and stating that when reviewing Rule 12(b)(1) subject matter jurisdiction decision, factual findings are reviewed
for clear error and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo).
The issue of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a claim also has been
held to be an issue of law requiring de novo review. See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1186 (loth Cir. 1998); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431,434 (1Ith
Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of I1l., 141 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.
1998); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996); Franks v.
Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1998); Santee Sioux Tribe v.
Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
1997); Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1995); Ristow v. South
Carolina Ports Auth., 27 F.3d 84, 86 (4th Cir.), vacatedon other grounds, 513 U.S. 1011
(1994); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 517 U.S.
44 (1996); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992).
Also reviewed de novo are decisions concerning the sovereign immunity of Native
American tribes, see, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Babitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497-98 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 1997), and the sovereign immunity of foreign states under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see, e.g.,
Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1998); First City, TexasHouston, N.A. v. Rafidain Bank, 150 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1997); Eckert Int'l, Inc. v. Fiji, 32 F.3d 77,
79 (4th Cir. 1994); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
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vidual defendants are also reviewed de novo.18 1 Since there is no indication Congress wished to alter this practice, it is recommended that immunity-based dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), § 1915A(b), and
§ 1997e(c) also be reviewed de novo.
IV.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE "DELUSIONAL" OR "WHOLLY
INCREDIBLE" COMPLAINT

As noted by the Supreme Court in Neitzke, "federal district judges
are all too familiar" with "claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.' 82 While the federal courts have the authority to clear their
dockets of such claims, the guidelines by which that authority is to be

exercised are somewhat amorphous. In essence, the Supreme Court has
limited itself to holding only that claims based on "delusional" or

"wholly incredible" allegations may be dismissed as factually frivolous

183
Howwhile those based on merely "improbable" allegations may not.

181. For opinions finding de novo review appropriate for absolute immunity decisions, see, e.g., Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997)(absolute immunity
in general); Roberts v. Kling, 104 F.3d 316, 319 (10th Cir. 1997)(prosecutorial immunity); Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996)(judicial immunity); Archie
v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1996)(same); Livingston v. Guice, 68 F.3d 460, 1995
WL 610355, at *5 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995)(unpublished table decision)(same); Duty v. City of
Springdale,42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994); Robinson v. VolkswagenwerkAG, 940 F.2d
1369, 1370 (10th Cir. 1991)(prosecutorial immunity); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387,
390-91 (5th Cir. 1982)(judicial immunity).
For opinions finding de novo review appropriate for qualified immunity decisions,
see, e.g., El Dia,Inc. v. Rossello, 165 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1999); Maughon v. Bibb County,
160 F.3d 658, 660 (11th Cir. 1998); McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 1998);
Collins v. Bellinghausen, 153 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1998); Chappel v. Montgomery
County FireProtectionDist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1997); Pierce v. Smith,
117 F.3d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Watson, 106 F.3d 774, 777 & n.7 (7th Cir.
1997); Forman v. Richmond Police Dep't., 104 F.3d 950, 956-57 (7th Cir. 1997);
Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Elder v. Holloway,
510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994)("Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a
particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified
immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of 'legal facts.' . . . That question
of law, like the generality of such questions, must be resolved de novo on appeal.").
182. See Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989).
183. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court declined to define the standard for dismissing factually frivolous claims
with more precision, stating that the district courts were in the best position to determine
which claims fell into that category. See id. at 33; see also Milton Roberts, Annotation,
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ever, the long and tortuous history of Denton itself suggests that further
guidance may be appropriate.
A.

The Tortuous History ofDenton v. Hernandez

Denton involved an incarcerated plaintiffs allegation of multiple
rapes by many different persons in different state institutions. The incarcerated plaintiff, Hernandez, made his rape allegations in five separate
civil rights complaints filed in forma pauperis in 1983 and 1984 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 84 The
five cases were referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that
they be dismissed as frivolous.
The magistrate reasoned that "each complaint, taken
separately, is not necessarily frivolous," but that "a different picture emerges from a reading of all five complaints together." As he explained: " '[Hernandez] alleges that both guards and inmates, at different institutions, subjected him to sexual assaults. Despite the fact
that different defendants are allegedly responsible for
each assault, the purported modus operandi is identical
in every case. Moreover, the attacks occurred only sporadically throughout a three year period. The facts thus
appear to be 'wholly fanciful' and justify this court's
dismissal of the actions as frivolous.'"... [T]he district
court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate and
dismissed the complaints.

Standardsfor Determining Whether Proceedings in forma pauperis are Frivolous and
thus Subject to Dismissal Under28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), 52 A.L.R. FED. 679 (1981 & Supp.
1994); David B. Sweet, Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction andApplication of 28
US.C.S. § 1915, Providingfor Federal Court ProceedingsIn Forma Pauperis, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 817 (1995).
184. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 28 n.1. The five cases are as follows: Hernandez v.
Denton, 83-cv-0645 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint filed June 1, 1983); Hernandez v. Denton, 83cv-1348 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint filed Nov. 8, 1983); Hernandez v. Ylst, 84-cv-1074 (E.D.
Cal.) (complaint filed Aug. 20, 1984); Hernandez v. Ylst, 84-cv-1 198 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint filed Sept. 17, 1984); and Hernandez v. Ylst, 85-cv-0084 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint
filed Jan. 21, 1985).
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Hernandez appealed the dismissal of three of the five
cases .... Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.1 85 Hernandezv. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421 (1988).
In relevant part, Judge Schroeder's lead opinion concluded that a district court could dismiss a complaint as
factually frivolous only if the allegations conflicted with
judicially noticeable facts .... In this case, Judge
Schroeder wrote, the court could not dismiss Hernandez's claims as frivolous because it was impossible to
take judicial notice that none of the alleged rapes occurred. 861 F.2d, at 1426. Judge Wallace concurred on
the ground that Circuit precedent required that Hernandez be given notice that his claims were to be dismissed
as frivolous and a chance to amend his complaints to
remedy the deficiencies. Id., at 1427. Judge Aldisert
dissented. He was of the opinion that the allegations
were "the hallucinations of a troubled man," id., at 1440,
and that no further amendment could save the complaint,
id., at 1439-1440.186

185. Aside from reversing the dismissal of the rape claims, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of various due process and Eighth Amendment claims that were not
based on the rape allegations. See Hemandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1422-24 (1988)
(affirming dismissal of claims prior to Supreme Court's grant of certiorari); Hernandez v.
Denton, 929 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of claims after Supreme
Court's vacatur and remand). This note and notes 185 through 187 are the author's; they
are not from the Supreme Court opinion.
186. Judge Aldisert also noted the following:
[lt must be acknowledged that Hemandez has established a world
record capable of qualifying for the Guinness Book of Records: the
only person who has been raped 28 separate times without knowing
at the time that this was happening to him. Suffice it to say, as an experienced student and researcher in prisoner civil rights petitions, I
believe that these three appeals go beyond the pale of frivolity. They
are sheer and utter nonsense. They can be understood only by realizing that the appellant was diagnosed at Folsom Prison as an inmate
requiring psychiatric treatment, that he was ordered transferred for
this purpose, and that at the time of these appeals he is a patient at the
Atascadero State Hospital.
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[The Supreme Court] granted [Hemandez's] first petition for a writ of certiorari, 493 U.S. 801 (1989), vacated
the judgment, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of [the Supreme Court's] intervening decision in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). On
remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision. 929 F.2d 1374 (1990). Judge Schroeder modified
her original opinion to state that judicial notice was just
"one useful standard" for determining factual frivolousness under § 1915(d), but adhered to her position that the
case could not be dismissed because no judicially noticeable fact could contradict Hernandez's claims of
rape. 18 7 Id., at 1376. Judge Wallace and Judge Aldis189
ert 18 repeated their earlier views.
The Supreme Court again vacated and remanded, finding that the
Court of Appeals had incorrectly limited the power of the district courts
to dismiss frivolous cases under § 1915(d) and held that "a finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are
judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." 190
Hernandez, 861 F.2d at 1483 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
187. Judge Schroeder also found as follows:
[B]ecause rape by prison guards or deliberate indifference by prison
guards to rape by inmates would raise constitutional concerns, the
claims were not patently without legal substance. Although the
claims of such repeated similar events undoubtedly involved some
exaggeration, a majority of us were unable to say with certainty that
none of them occurred and that the claims were therefore lacldng in
any factual basis so as to be deemed "fanciful" under section 1915(d).
Hernandez v. Denton, 929 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990).
188. Judge Aldisert also opined that the Supreme Court's remand of the case to the
Ninth Circuit indicated its unanimous sub silentio agreement with his position "that it
was impossible to amend the complaint to assert a viable cause of action." Hernandez,
929 F.2d at 1377 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
189. Denton, 504 U.S. at 29-31 (first alteration in original) (first two citations

omitted).

190. Id.at3l,33.
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9
Upon remand of the three cases to the district court,' the assigned
magistrate judge recommended that the rape allegations be dismissed:

Plaintiff is a diagnosed delusional schizophrenic paranoid personality. Psychotropic drugs have been administered to plaintiff by force under circumstances reminiscent of the sexual assaults alleged by plaintiff. Petition-

ers [sic] allegations that between 1983 and 1985 15
prison officials at two separate prisons drugged and
raped plaintiff 28 times, often while he slept, are fanciful, fantastic and delusional and it is absolutely clear that
the deficiencies cannot be corrected. Plaintiff's rape
claims should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d). 9 2

However, a subsequently assigned magistrate judge vacated the prior
191. Upon remand to the Ninth Circuit from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme
Court decisions in Neitzke and Denton, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1987). In its order of remand, the Court of Appeals emphasized language from the Supreme Court decision in Denton that could be construed as
suggesting that Hernandez's allegations did not appear to be frivolous:
In its opinion remanding the case to this court, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that an in forma pauperis complaint may not be
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) "simply because the court finds
the plaintiff's allegations unlikely" and that the plaintiff's factual allegations "must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff." Denton, 112 S.
Ct. at 1733. The Court also listed various factors which an appeals
court might consider in reviewing the district court's decision to dismiss a complaint as frivolous. These factors reflect, for example, the
concern that the district court not "inappropriately resolve[] genuine
issues of disputed fact" in the context of a frivolousness determination. See id. at 1734.
Hemandez v. Denton, 966 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1992).
192. Hernandez v. Ylst, 85-cv-0084 (E.D. Cal.), Findings & Recommendations of
Magistrate Judge filed Sept. 8, 1993, at 6; Hernandez v. Denton, 83-cv-1348 (E.D. Cal.),
Findings & Recommendations filed Sept. 9, 1993, at 6-7; Hemandez v. Denton, 83-cv0645 (E.D. Cal.), Findings & Recommendations filed Sept. 9, 1993, at 5. Copies of these
documents and the docket sheets from all five Hernandez cases are on file with the New
York Law School Law Review.
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magistrate judge's report in which dismissal was recommended, found
that the complaints stated a colorable claim against the correctional officials who were accused of drugging and sexually assaulting Hernandez
and ordered service on those defendants.19 3 Although two of the three
remaining actions were dismissed for failure of Hernandez to complete
and return to the court United States Marshal forms required for service
of process, 94 the last remaining action was dismissed pursuant to the
defendants' summary judgment motion in February 1996.95
Thus, it took thirteen years and at least fifteen judges'9 6 weighing in
on the frivolousness issue at nine procedural junctures with thirteen separate opinions before Hemandez's claims were permitted to proceed. The
various opinions expressed by the many judges involved in Denton,
which are illustrative of the inherent difficulty of grappling with the concept of frivolousness, strongly suggest there is a need for a more structured approach to the determination of whether a claim is "wholly incredible," "partly incredible" or only "merely improbable."' 97 While no
193. See Hemandez v. Ylst, 85-ev-0084 (E.D. Cal.), Order filed Oct. 29, 1993, at
3-4; Hernandez v. Denton, 83-cv-1348 (E.D. Cal.), Order filed Jan. 26, 1994, at 3-4; Hernandez v. Denton, 83-ev-0645 (E.D. Cal.), Order filed Oct. 29, 1993, at 3. It is noted that
the author of these orders was the same magistrate judge who, in 1986, recommended
that the rape claims be dismissed as frivolous. See Hemandez v. Denton, 83-cv-0645, 83cv-1348, 84-ev-1074, 84-cv-1 198, 85-cv-0084 (E.D. Cal.), Findings & Recommendation
filed Apr. 17, 1986. Copies of these documents are on file with the New York Law
School Law Review.
194. See Hernandez v. Ylst, 85-cv-0084 (E.D. Cal.), Order filed Mar. 9, 1994
(adopting magistrate judge recommendation and dismissing action without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)); Hemandez v. Denton, 83-cv-1348
(E.D. Cal.), Order filed Mar. 3, 1994 (same). Copies of the recommendation in 85-cv0084, the order in 83-cv-1348 and the docket sheets are on file with the New York Law
School Law Review.
195. See Hernandez v. Denton, 83-cv-0645 (E.D. Cal. Order filed Feb. 29, 1996).
A notice of appeal was not filed. See id.; docket sheet. Copies of the order and docket
sheet are on file with the New York Law School Law Review.
196. This number includes two magistrate judges, one district court judge, three
court of appeals judges and the nine Supreme Court justices who were on the court in
1992. Between the Supreme Court's 1989 remand of the action and its 1992 decision,
two justices were replaced. If the two retired justices who sat in 1989 are also counted,
the total would be seventeen.
197. See also Sean Munger, Comment, Bill ClintonBugged My Brain!:Delusional
Claims in Federal Court, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1809 (1998) (advocating procedures to avoid
misclassifying meritorious cases as delusional and criticizing federal courts' current use
of§ 1915(e)(2)).
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hard and fast rule is possible in this area, it is hoped the following suggestions will both clarify some of the relevant issues and aid judges in
the development of their own guidelines for making frivolousness deter-

minations.
0-

0
0----

Scenario 2: A plaintiff files in federal district court a
complaint naming "Satan and his staff' as defendants,
alleging the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional

rights.
Question: Should this complaint be dismissed as factually frivolous?

O---- 0

B. DistinguishingBetween the "Wholly Incredible," the "PartlyIncredible" and the "Merely Improbable"
1. Recommended Terminology and Definitions
As an initial matter, it is recommended that the courts avoid use of
the term "delusional" in making frivolousness determinations. The word
"delusional" is a term of art more appropriately used by those in the psychiatric field; when applied to legal pleadings in the context of a frivolousness determination, it is imprecise and often inaccurate.1 98 Moreover,

198. The use of the term "delusional" by judges in making a frivolousness determuination is more akin to the usage of lay persons than psychiatric experts. In most cases,
a judge's frivolousness determination is based exclusively on the pleading itself, without
benefit of expert opinion or personal examination of the litigant. The lay use of the term
"delusional," however, is far broader than its use by those in the psychiatric field. See
United States v. Sullivan, 544 F.2d 1052, 1056 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting expert testimony that "people who are considered to have delusional ideas by the layman are not
necessarily considered to be delusional by the psychiatrist or the 'psychologist"). While
all litigants exhibiting delusional symptoms might be lumped together by the lay person,
a psychiatric diagnosis might classify some or all of them as something other than "delu-
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use of the term can be unnecessarily insulting, upsetting or possibly
damaging to those to whom it is applied.1 99 The phrase "wholly incredisional." See AMERICAN PsYcHIATRIc ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS III-R 114 (3d ed. 1980) (distinguishing between organic delusional
syndrome, delirium, dementia and organic hallucinosis); id. at 356 (distinguishing between delusion, hallucination and overvalued idea). Moreover, even the experts are not
always in agreement as to the meaning of "delusion." See Jon R. Sorensen, Belief in
Aliens No Hindrance to Doctor: Regents Allow Him to PracticeBecause His Work is Not

Affected, BOSTON NEvS, November 21, 1992, at 1 (noting that, in license revocation
hearing, psychiatrists could not agree on meaning of"delusion"). According to the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual, a delusion is
[a] false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external
reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone else believes and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious
proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (i.e., it
is not an article of religious faith).
When a false belief involves an extreme value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy
credibility.
& STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra, at 356. The preceding definition distinguishes between delusions of fact that can be disproved from delusions of feelings that
DIAGNOSTIC

are not subject to disproof. See Allen C. Snyder, Competency to Refise Lifesaving
Treatment: Valuing the Nonlogical Aspects of a Person'sDecision, ISSUES INL. & MED.,

December 22, 1994, at 299. A more limited definition states that a delusion is "an idea
which is (a) contrary to fact; (b) inappropriate to the person's education, intelligence, or
culture; and (c) adhered to in spite of plain evidence that it is false." HENRY A.
DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 407 (2d ed. 1965); accordBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

429 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "delusion"); id. at 794 (defining "insane delusion"); see also
Steven C. Dilsaver, Differentiating Organic from Functional Psychosis, AMERICAN
FAMILY PHYSICIAN, March 1992, at 1173.
199. I use the words "upsetting" and "damaging" in several senses. Being labeled
delusional not only can lead to hurt feelings, but may lead to anger, both in general and
against those considered responsible for the labeling, and, in certain cases, may exacerbate or cause further deterioration in the labeled person's psychological state. The fact
that even persons in good mental health may be injured by being labeled "delusional" is
illustrated by the general recognition among the courts that a published imputation of
insanity or other mental impairment can be libelous per se and actionable without special

damages. See Annotation, Libel & Slander: Actionability ofImputing to PrivatePerson
Mental Disorder or Incapacity, or Impairment of Mental Faculties, 23 A.L.R.3D 652,

657 § 3 (1969 & Supp. 1995); 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel & Slander § 91 (1970); 53 C.J.S.
Libel & Slander § 24 (1987). Of course, a judge making such a statement as part of a
frivolousness determination would be absolutely immune from liability for damages. See
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ble," which is somewhat less likely to cause offense than "delusional"
and which is broad enough to encompass all of the other catch-phrases
employed by the Supreme Court in describing the factually frivolous
pleading, will be used in this article to describe such pleadings.
Specifically, the phrase "wholly incredible" will be used to describe
those allegations of fact to which no reasonable person could give credence, even after according the allegations a liberal construction 200 and,

if applicable, giving wide latitude to the beliefs of the litigant's particular
subculture. 20 1 This working definition allows for a large degree of flexi-

bility. First, giving questionable factual allegations a liberal construction
would require that the pleading be viewed in the light most favorable to
the litigant and that the litigant be accorded the benefit of all reasonable

inferences.02 In other words, if a pleading reasonably can be interpreted

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1988) (holding that judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages for actions performed in their judicial capacity, but not
for actions performed in administrative, legislative or executive capacities).
200. The working definition of "wholly incredible" assumes that most, if not all,
of the pleadings which will raise a question of factual frivolousness will be pro se pleadings. In the event that a represented litigant's pleading is under consideration, the liberal
construction portion of the definition would not apply. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (pro se allegations are "h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (pro se
pleadings are to be given liberal construction); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
113 (1993) (pro se prisoners' pleadings must be liberally construed); see also Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief'). However, the pleadings of both
represented and unrepresented litigants are to be "so construed as to do substantial justice." FED. R. CiV. P. 8(f).
201. The term "subculture" is used here to refer to a group of persons "exhibiting
characteristic patterns of behavior [or belief] sufficient to distinguish it from others
within an embracing culture or society." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1173 (1984) (defining "subculture"). For purposes of this discussion, "subculture" is not limited to groups which can be defined along ethnic, regional, economic or
social lines or which have organizational coherence; a group of people sharing common
or similar beliefs may be a subculture, even if there is no other connection among the
group "members." Consideration of the beliefs of a subculture is necessary only if the
pleadings suggest that a questionable factual allegation is based on such beliefs. Otherwise, the allegation should be judged in light of the beliefs of a reasonable person in the
predominant culture or society.
202. See Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1993), modified on other
grounds, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1994). Although Dory involved a sua sponte dismissal of a
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as either factually frivolous or not factually frivolous, the courts should
favor the latter interpretation. Second, the working definition requires
that the beliefs of subcultures be taken into account, although, as discussed below, such beliefs are not necessarily to be deemed legitimate
merely because they are sincerely held.
The phrase "partly incredible" will be used to refer to allegations that
consist of both incredible and credible elements. "Merely improbable"
will be used to refer to those allegations which do not quite rise to the
level of "wholly incredible."
o ----0
Scenario 3: A group of seven plaintiffs, all claiming to
be members of a religious group, files in federal district
court a complaint against several newscasters and actors,
some of whom had been dead for many years before the
filing of the complaint, alleging that the defendants induced the plaintiffs to commit various crimes by issuing,
during a two month period preceding the filing of the
complaint, secret orders over the plaintiffs' television
sets.
Question: Should this complaint be dismissed as factu-

ally frivolous?
0 o--- 0
2.

Subcultures and Wholly Incredible Factual Allegations

Many questionable factual allegations will be susceptible to empirical proof. In that instance, allegations which are contrary to universally
accepted empirical data should be deemed wholly incredible. However,
many questionable factual allegations, although not accepted by many
reasonable persons, are not readily disproved. Such allegations range
from those involving religion and the occult, which may never be sus-

pro se complaint, the liberal construction requirement proposed in this article would apply whether the frivolousness determination is made sua sponte or after the opposing
parties have had an opportunity to respond. In the event that additional pleadings are
filed, the liberal construction of the complaint would be made in the context of all pleadings on file.
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ceptible to empirical proof, to those involving natural and scientific phe-

nomena, which may eventually be either proved or disproved.
When a litigant makes a factual allegation which, even if rejected by

most reasonable people, cannot be readily disproved and is represented,
or is known, to be based on the beliefs of a particular subculture, that
allegation requires special scrutiny. °3 Such an allegation usually should
not be deemed wholly incredible unless it is too extreme or outrageous to
be tolerated by reasonable persons.2° In that event, it can be found
wholly incredible regardless of the sincerity or the number of the subculture's members. Alternatively, a court may find that a litigant's beliefs are too idiosyncratic to represent a subculture or that the number of
people who hold a particular belief is too small to constitute a genuine
subculture. 0 5

203. In making its determination, the court's primary focus should be on the allegation itself, not the subculture. However, the court's analysis of the questionable allegation should include its understanding, gained through the pleadings or judicial notice,
of the subculture and its doctrines-i.e., the subculture is part of the allegation's context.
204. For lack of any truly neutral base point, the determination of whether an allegation is too "extreme" or "outrageous" must be made from the perspective of a reasonable person within the mainstream of American culture. The "reasonable person" in this
context is similar to the "reasonable person" of tort law, the "reasonable person knowing
all the relevant facts" who considers judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and
the "reasonable observer" who determines whether a religious display indicates governmental endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause. See Americans United
for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (6th
Cir. 1992) (comparing three concepts). In the tort context, the following has been said
about the "reasonable person":
The courts have gone to unusual pains to emphasize the abstract and
hypothetical character of this mythical person. He is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up
to standard. Nor is it proper to identify him with any member of the
very jury which is to apply the standard; he is rather a personification
of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the
jury's social judgment.
W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 175 (5th ed. 1984)
(footnotes omitted); accordJ.D. LEE & BARRY A. LiNDAmL, MODERN TORT LAW §§ 3.04-

3.06 (1988).
205. It is a truism that the difference between a religion and-a cult often is simply a
matter of the number of adherents. In some cases, this may also be the difference between a frivolous and a nonfrivolous allegation. But, in general, the number of adherents
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Thus, the beliefs of many religions in the existence of various supernatural beings and events should not necessarily be deemed wholly incredible even if such beliefs are deemed false by the majority. This principle is aptly reflected in United States v. Ballard,2 6 where the defendants were indicted for using the mails to obtain funds by false representation. In soliciting funds, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that
they had spoken with Jesus and Saint Germain, could cure the sick, and
were delegated to serve as divine messengers. 207 In reversing a lower
court determination that the issue of whether the defendants' religious
beliefs were true or false should have gone to the jury, the Supreme
Court stated the following:
The religious views espoused by [the defendants] might
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But
if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same
can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When
the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. 08
However, as suggested above, this general rule of judicial restraint
has its limits: if the allegations, or the beliefs upon which the allegations

should not be determinative. This factor should only be relevant in those instances where
an allegation is questionable and is known, or is alleged, to be based on the beliefs of a
group and the court has enough information concerning the group itself to suspect that it
is not a genuine subculture. The information about the group would probably be supplied
by the litigant making the questionable allegation either in that litigant's pleadings or in
response to inquiry from the court or other litigants.
206. 322 U.S. 78 (1944)
207. See id. at 79-82.
208. Id. at 87; accord Presbyterian Church v. Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (First Amendment forbids the civil courts from "determin[ing]
matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines
and the importance of those doctrines to the religion"); cf Genius v. Pepe, 986 F. Supp.
668, 683 (D. Mass. 1997) ("While Voodoo might plausibly seem a bizarre and irrational
system of belief to a mind acculturated in Western thought, it does not follow that its
adherents thereby suffer from a mental disease or defect. There are plenty of irrational
beliefs running loose in Westernized society-astrology is a mundane example-whose
followers are not considered clinically insane."), aff'd, 147 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1773 (1999).
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are based, are too extreme or outrageous, the allegations may be found
wholly incredible regardless of the number of adherents.20 9 Additionally,
allegations based on sham religious beliefs are likewise not entitled to
any preferential treatment. 210 However, there can be no easily drawn line
between subculture beliefs that cannot be categorized as factually frivolous and those which can. Such a determination must be made on a case-

by-case basis. 1l

Scenarios 1 and 2, both of which are drawn from actual federal court

cases,212 involve immediately recognizable subcultural beliefs that many
reasonable persons would reject as false: (1) the belief that there have
been extraterrestrial visitors to this planet and that the government has
suppressed evidence of such visitors, and (2) the belief in the existence
of Satan. For purposes of a frivolousness determination, however, factual allegations based on such beliefs should not be deemed wholly incredible, since they are not contrary to universally accepted empirical
data or too extreme or outrageous to be given credence by reasonable
21
persons. 13 While both the extraterrestrial and the Satanic actions may be

209. For example, allegations based on harmful beliefs of a suicide or murder cult
may be deemed "too extreme." See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 715 (1981) ("religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection";
however, some religious claims may be "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation,
as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
210. See Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (To merit protection
under the Free Exercise Clause, the "claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely held;
the First Amendment does not extend to 'so-called religions which ... are obviously
shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.' ")
(quoting Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Theriault v.
Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974))), modified on other grounds, 65 F.3d 148,
149 (9th Cir. 1995).
211. Additionally, even subculture-based allegations which are not too extreme or
outrageous may be found wholly incredible if the context of the particular pleading
makes plain that the allegation is beyond reason. In many such instances, the subculturebased allegation will be such that no reasonable member of that subculture could give it
credence.
212. The "petition for writ of habeas corpus extraterrestrial" was filed in Citizens
Against UFO Secrecy v. Orr, No. 83-1932 (D.D.C.) (petition and other documents on file
with the New York Law School Law Review). The complaint against Satan and his staff is
discussed in United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan, 54 F.R.D. 282, 282-83 (W.D. Pa. 1971).

213. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the "petition for writ of habeas corpus
extraterrestrial" is its first exhibit, which, on its face, appears to be a copy of an FBI re-
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susceptible to dismissal for lack of a basis in law, they should
not be
214
dismissed for lack of a basis in fact, i.e., as wholly incredible.
Scenario 3, in which religious group members claimed they received
port dated March 22, 1950, concerning the Air Force's recovery of nine alien bodies

from

three crashed airships. See Exhibit 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Extraterrestrial,
Citizens Against UFO Secrecy (No. 83-1932) (on file with the New York Law School Law
Review). This report, which was not challenged by the government in its answering papers, makes impossible a conclusion that the petition was wholly incredible (at least as
the record stood at the time the case was dismissed). However, as discussed in the text,
even in the absence of the FBI report, the petition should not be deemed wholly incredible.
214. In its response to the "petition for writ of habeas corpus extraterrestrial" and
the court's order to show cause, the government argued that (a) the petitioner, Citizens
Against UFO Secrecy, lacked standing to bring the petition as it failed to allege any injury to itself, and (b) the petition was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which authorizes
the issuance of habeas corpus writs, as it was not signed and filed by either the incarcerated persons or someone with authority to act on their behalf. See Government Response
(on file with the New York Law SchoolLaw Review). After a hearing, the court dismissed
the action on both the grounds presented by the government and because the petition
failed to allege that the incarcerated persons were being held within the jurisdiction of
that district court. See Order filed July 29, 1983 (on file with the New York Law School
Law Review); Transcript of July 28, 1983 Hearing (on file with the New York Law School
Law Review).
In the action against Satan and his staff, jurisdiction was alleged under 18 U.S.C.
§ 241, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan,
54 F.R.D. 282, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In a tongue-in-cheek opinion, the district court
denied informapauperisstatus to the plaintiff, stating:
Even if plaintiff's complaint reveals a prima facie recital of the infiringement of the civil rights of a citizen of the United States, the
Court has serious doubts that the complaint reveals a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted by the court. We question whether
plaintiff may obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this
judicial district.
Id. at 283. The court also could have dismissed the portions of the action based on (a) 18
U.S.C. § 241, since that criminal statute does not authorize a private civil cause of action,
see Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989); Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675,
677 n.1 (10th Cir. 1987); Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Say. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 760 (5th Cir.
1987); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980), and (b) 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
since, absent any allegation that Satan and his staff conspired or acted in concert with any
state agent, the defendants did not act "under color of state law" as required by that statute, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (private party may be
liable under § 1983 if "he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents").
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secret orders to commit crimes from their television sets, is an example
of an action which could be dismissed as wholly incredible even if the
factual allegations were based on sincerely held beliefs of a subculture.
These factual allegations are wholly incredible because they are too extreme or outrageous to be tolerated by reasonable persons. Even if portions of the claim are technically possible, the receiving of orders over a
television, the claim as a whole depends too heavily on factual allegations that a reasonable person cannot accept-e.g., dead persons induced
the plaintiffs to commit crimes. As discussed further in Part IV.D.2. of
this article, the cumulative effect of many questionable factual allegations may require a court to conclude that the factual allegations, considered together, are wholly incredible.215
3.

Federal Rule of Evidence 610 and Religion-Based Factual Allegations

The arms-length treatment to be accorded religious beliefs by the
federal courts is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 610, which states
that "[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their
nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. ' 216 Rule 610 is
similar to the Supreme Court's holding in Ballard that the First Amendment prohibits the courts from inquiring into the veracity of religious

215.

As discussed earlier in this section of the text, when religious beliefs are

brought into court, it is difficult to draw the line between the wholly incredible allegation
and the allegation which should be accorded respect. The plaintiffs described in scenario
3 are not easily distinguished from a party who defends a breach of contract action by
claiming that a saint advised him that the contract was immoral and should no longer be
honored. In that instance, the religious-based allegation does not appear too extreme or
outrageous: the saint did not induce the defendant to commit a crime, and the rejection of
the contract on moral grounds can be legally evaluated without reliance on the questionable factual allegations-i.e., the court can determine whether the breach was justified on
public policy grounds. If a subculture sincerely believes in the ability of the living to
communicate with the dead or supernatural beings, factual allegations based on that belief, by themselves, should not be found wholly incredible.
216. FED. R. EVID. 610; see FED. R. EVID. 610 Advisory Committee's Note on
1972 Proposed Rules (Rule 610 prohibits "inquiry into the religious beliefs or opinions of
a witness for the purpose of showing that his character for truthfulness is affected by their
nature."); see, e.g., United States v. Kalaydjian, 784 F.2d 53, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

1048

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

doctrines.2 17 However, the advisory committee notes following Rule 610

make clear that evidence of religious beliefs may be admitted for purposes other than witness credibility; for example, "an inquiry for the purpose of showing interest or bias because of [the religious beliefs or
opinions of a witness] is not within the prohibition. Thus, disclosure of
affiliation with a church which is a party to the litigation would be allowable under the rule.' 2 18 The case law indicates that Rule 610 also is
inapplicable where evidence of religious belief is offered to prove entitlement to clerical privilege, damages, modus operandi, motive, or the
basis for a claim or defense.2 19
It does not appear that any of the above exceptions to Rule 610 apply
to a frivolousness determination. 220 A frivolousness determination requires the court to establish whether a factual assertion rises above a preliminary threshold level of credibility, i.e., whether it is more than
wholly incredible. However, as discussed earlier, religion-based allegations that are too extreme or outrageous, or which are based on sham religious beliefs, are not entitled to the protection generally accorded religious beliefs.221 Thus, to this limited extent, a court making a frivolousness determination may properly inquire into a litigant's religious beliefs
to determine whether factual allegations based on those beliefs are

217. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944); Presbyterian Church v.
Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,450 (1969).
218. Fed R. Evid. 610 Advisory Committee's Notes on 1972 Proposed Rules.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1986),
(holding that Rule 610 is inapplicable when evidence of religious belief is offered to
show motive); 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6153, at 314 (3rd ed. 1993) (noting cases where Rule 610 was found
inapplicable because evidence of religious belief was offered to prove bias, entitlement to
clerical privilege, damages, modus operandi, motive, or basis for claim or defense).
220. It is also concluded that the assertion of religion-based allegations, by itself,
does not constitute a waiver of the Rule 610 privilege. But cf State v. West, 168 Ariz.
292, 812 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Ct App. 1991) (holding that once defendant "opened the
door" by presenting religious justification testimony, prosecutor is permitted on crossexamination to rebut statements offered to justify conduct to show that justification claim
was selective and inconsistent). It appears that such a broad waiver exception would
render meaningless the protection accorded by the First Amendment and Rule 610.
221. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text. The complications involved in assessing religion-based allegations are vastly multiplied in those instances
where there is the possibility that the religious beliefs compel the litigant to lie under
certain circumstances. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supranote 218, at 317-18 & nn.27-29.
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wholly incredible.2 22

Scenario 4: A plaintiff files in federal district court a
complaint against a New York City police officer and
Queen Elizabeth II alleging that the officer, without justification, (a) hit the plaintiff in the head with a crowbar
after a minor traffic accident involving the officer's
automobile; (b) arrested him; and (c) after handcuffing
him, permitted the Queen, by means of mental telepathy,
to assault and kill him. The plaintiff alleged that "good
ghosts" revived him.
Question: Should the complaint be dismissed as factu-

ally frivolous?
O---- 0

222. A similarly limited "credibility" determination is made when the courts test
the sincerity of a party's religious beliefs in a case brought under the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause. In that instance, the purpose of inquiring into the religious beliefs
is to determine whether the party actually adheres to those beliefs, not whether the beliefs
are actually true. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965) (in determining whether draft registrant qualified as conscientious objector, "[the] task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are,
in his own scheme of things, religious.... [W]hile the 'truth' of a [religious] belief is not
open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly held.' This is
the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case."); Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (same); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("Our scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular
belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.... [C]ourts are not permitted to ask
whether a particular belief is appropriate or true-however unusual or unfamiliar the
belief may be"; rejecting defendants' attempt to demonstrate "as an objective matter, the
plaintiff's belief is not accurate or logical"); Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1526
(10th Cir. 1991).
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"PartlyIncredible" FactualAllegations

1. Distinguishing Between the "Partly Incredible" and the "Wholly Incredible"
The presence of some wholly incredible factual allegations in a complaint should not necessarily result in the dismissal of the entire complaint as frivolous. In that situation, a determination should be made as
to whether the incredible allegations irremediably infect the entire complaint. For example, if the complaint's central factual allegations are
primarily incredible, and the only credible factual allegations are collateral to the asserted claims, the entire complaint may be subject to dismissal as "wholly incredible." Conversely, a complaint containing incredible allegations, which nonetheless appears to state a cause of action
based upon factual allegations that are not incredible, is only "partly incredible" and need not necessarily be dismissed as factually frivolous.
Factual allegations should be deemed "partly," not "wholly," incredible
where a substantial portion of the facts which are central to a claim are
credible and the incredible allegations, whether or not collateral to the
material facts, do not render the entire claim impossible to try.
2.

Procedures for Processing "Partly Incredible" Actions

When a complaint is deemed to be partly incredible, the court may
22 3
proceed as follows:
1. If the incredible portions of the complaint are insubstantial or
peripheral to the material facts, or segregated or not substantially
intertwined with the remainder of the complaint, the court may
simply order the incredible portions stricken under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(f) 22 4 and allow the action to proceed as

223. The suggested actions may be taken at the inception of the action, i.e., upon
filing of the complaint, or at a later pretrial conference. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1) (At
any conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to "the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses.").
224. Rule 12(f) provides as follows:
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usual; or
if the incredible portions are substantial, but the credible factual
allegations suggest that it is possible that a proper claim can be
stated, the court may order the entire complaint stricken under
Rule 12(f) with leave to file an amended complaint containing
only credible factual allegations; 225 and
2.

Upon further proceedings in the action, whether or not an
amended complaint was required, if it appears the litigant who
previously made the incredible allegations will be unable to proceed without continued reliance on incredible allegations which
adversely impact the orderly disposition of the case, the court
may resolve the problem in a number of ways:
a.

once again, strike the incredible allegations and/or require
amendment of the inappropriate pleadings;

b.

sanction the litigant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) or other sanction provisions;226 or

Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if
no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made
by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the
party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may
order strickenfrom any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,impertinent,orscandalous material.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). The emphasized portion makes clear

that the court may enter such an order sua sponte immediately upon the filing
of the complaint and prior to its service on the defendants.
225. See FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a) (amendment of pleadings).
226. Rule 16(f) states, in pertinent part, that "[i]f a party or party's attorney fails to
obey a scheduling or pretrial order,.., the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D)." FED. R. Crv. P. 16(f). Under Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), and (D), the court may refuse to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses, prohibit that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence, strike pleadings or portions of pleadings, stay proceedings until the
order is obeyed, dismiss all or part of the action, render a default judgment against the
disobedient party, or hold that party in contempt. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Other
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appoint a guardian ad litem to prosecute the action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), 227 if the litigant is
found incompetent to proceed.

The suggested procedures balance the court's need to efficiently
manage its docket with the right of even incompetent litigants to seek the
protection of the courts when their rights are violated. If it appears that a
litigant may have a valid cause of action, the litigant's right to seek redress should not be automatically forfeited by the inclusion of factually
incredible allegations in his or her pleadings. Under these circumstances,
it is the court's obligation to determine (a) whether the problematic allegations can be eliminated without dismissing the entire case and (b)
whether the action can thereafter proceed in an orderly fashion with regard to the credible allegations.
In scenario 4, involving the action against the New York City police
officer and Queen Elizabeth II, the allegations that the officer hit the
plaintiff in the head with a crowbar after a minor traffic accident and
falsely arrested him are clearly credible on their face and are not inextricably intertwined with the wholly incredible allegations involving Queen
Elizabeth, mental telepathy and the "good ghosts." Under these circumstances, the court could strike the wholly incredible allegations and proceed with the action following the procedures suggested above.
3.

Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem
The concept of a guardian ad litem is worth discussing
further since it appears that no published case or authority has considered its use when a court needs to determine whether particular factual allegations are wholly
incredible. Rule 17(c) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows: "The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for
an infant or incompetent person not otherwise repre-

relevant sanction provisions may include Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and
41(b).
227. Rule 17(c) states: "The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order
as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person." FED. R. CIV.
P. 17(c).
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sented in an action or shall make such other order as it
the protection of the infant or incomdeems proper for
228
petent person."
According to one commentator, "[tihe district court's power to appoint a guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c) has been broadly interpreted
and has not been limited by a narrow construction of the words "infant"
or "incompetent person." 229 Both the broad powers of the district court
in making, and the ambiguities inherent in, guardian ad litem determina-

tions are well illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hudnall v.
Sellner.230 In Hudnall, it was found that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in failing sua sponte to appoint a guardian ad litem or to
conduct a collateral inquiry into the competence of a defamation defendant whose out-of-court conduct may have indicated "a vindictive, delu-

sional bent of mind" and whose in-court conduct "similarly bespoke an
obsessive, utterly unrealistic, or perhaps desperately misplaced reliance

See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
229. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1570, at 504 (2d ed. 1990); see generally Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d
642, 651-53 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming appointment of guardian ad litem to pursue litigation where plaintiffs competence was in question); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032,
1033-35 (5th Cir. 1990) (psychiatric examination ordered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
35(a) and guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Rule 17(c); finding that due process
required hearing before declaring plaintiff incompetent and appointing guardian); Ingram
v. Ainsworth, 184 F.R.D. 90, 91-93 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (father permitted to pursue suit as
next friend of incompetent son under Rule 17(c); plaintiffs counsel advised to remove
father from case as next friend when son became "able to be consistently responsible in
this matter"); N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637, 649 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that Rule
17(c) gives court discretion to appoint guardian ad litem to protect persons who may be
competent for some purposes, but not for prosecution of action); Dixon v. Attorney Gen.
313 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (appointing guardian ad litem for seven mental institute inmates challenging constitutionality of state mental health statute); See also Seidner
v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (after prisoner, incarcerated in
mental institution, moved to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, court appointed
lawyer to file amicus curiae memorandum; § 2255 motion was thereafter deemed to include competency claim which was only presented in lawyer's memorandum, despite
movant's rejection of that claim); United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495, 498, 498 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (after counsel recommended seeking incompetency determination and
was, on this basis, replaced due to irreconcilable difference, former counsel was appointed as amicus curiae pursuant to Seidner, amicus counsel was to argue for incompetency finding, which current counsel opposed).
230. 800 F.2d 377 (4th Cir. 1986).
228.
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upon his ability to defend himself substantively. 2 3 1 However, the appellate court noted that "in hindsight, it may have been a better exercise
of discretion, particularly in view of Sellner's pro se appearance, to have
appointed a guardian ad litem out of an abundance of caution., 23 2 In
reaching this conclusion, the court discussed the parameters of the
court's duty to act when a party displays unusual behavior:
The practical problem presented by a case in which a
presumably competent party might be thought to be acting oddly, or foolishly, or self-destructively in prosecuting or defending a civil lawsuit, with or without
counsel, is a real one. The problem is whether and at
what point any duty devolves upon a court to initiate
specific inquiry into whether these surface manifestations suggest that the party may be "incompetent" in
fact.
Parties to litigation behave in a great variety of ways that
might be thought to suggest some degree of mental instability. Certainly [Rule 17(c)] contemplates by "incompetence" something other than mere foolishness or
improvidence, garden-variety or even egregious mendacity, or even various forms of the more common personality disorders.
What [Rule 17(c)] undoubtedly contemplates is that
form of mental deficiency which whether or not accompanied by other forms of personality disorder affects the
person's practical ability "to manage his or her own affairs." This is the general test applied by the civil law
for making adjudications of "incompetency" for a variety of purposes.... It is the test we have applied to determine whether a party was "incompetent" to defend
without representation in civil litigation. See Beckley
NationalBank, 115 F.2d at 517-19 ("test is the ability to
know the nature, character and effect of one's acts, and
231. Id.at385-86.
232. Id. at 386.
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to understand the subject matter of business transactions"). In common experience, there is of course no
necessary relationship between "mental incompetence"
in this special sense and various forms of mental derangement or personality disorder that may cause utterly
destructive conduct in litigation as in other
bizarre2 and
33
realms.
The Hudnall decision strongly suggests that district courts §hould err
in favor of holding a Rule 17(c) competency hearing, and that the Rule
17(c) test for appointment of a guardian ad litem is not difficult to satisfy. The Ninth Circuit explored this area a bit further in Krain v. Smallwood,34 where the Court reversed the district court's dismissal, with
prejudice, of two actions where the plaintiff refused to comply with an
order requiring him to produce information needed to determine whether
he was competent to proceed pro se. The Court ruled as follows:
If an infant or incompetent person is unrepresented, the
court should not enter a judgment which operates as a
judgment on the merits without complying with Rule
17(c). The preferred procedure when a substantial question exists regarding the mental competence of a party
proceeding pro se is for the district court to conduct a
hearing to determine whether or not the party is competent, so that a representative may be appointed if needed.
When the party refuses to cooperate, however, the court
may dismiss the case without prejudice. Or the court
may find that the incompetent person's interests would
be adequately protected by the appointment of a lawyer.
We hold that when a substantial question exists regarding the competence of an unrepresented party the court
may not dismiss with prejudice for failure to comply

233.

Id. at 385.

234. 880 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1989).
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235

The moderate approach of the Ninth Circuit appears to strike a good
balance between the right of even an incompetent person to bring a
meritorious claim, the duty of the court to efficiently manage its docket,
and the right of defendants to an orderly disposition of claims asserted

against them. While it is not suggested that such procedures be applied

to every action where factually frivolous claims are made in a complaint,
Rule 17(c) should be considered at least where the complaint suggests
the existence of non-frivolous claims and there is a substantial question
regarding the competence of the plaintiff.
0-

0---0

Scenario 5: A plaintiff files in federal district court a

complaint against various motion picture corporations,

alleging that portions of the plaintiff's personal life, including intimate memories, personal facts and family
235. Id. at 1121 (first citation omitted); accord Krain v. Brown, 891 F.2d 295,
1989 WL 149263, at *1 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision); Krain v. County of
Orange, 968 F.2d 1221, 1992 WL 164404 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision)
(also noting that by dismissing without prejudice, for failure of the plaintiff to cooperate
with competency inquiry, the plaintiff "will not be foreclosed from pursuing a meritorious claim in the future should his attitude change"); United States v. 30.64 Acres of
Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that district court erred in not inquiring
into competence when question clearly existed; "if it should appear during the course of
proceedings that a party may be suffering from a condition that materially affects his
ability to represent himself (if pro se), to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding, or otherwise to understand the nature of the proceedings, that
information should be brought to the attention of the court promptly.") (citations omitted).
The procedures outlined in Krain v. Smallwood appear to be consistent with those
required by the Fifth Circuit. See Bodnar v. Bodnar, 441 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1971)
(affirming dismissal, without prejudice, where plaintiff refused to submit to mental examination to determine whether she was competent to understand nature and effect of her
case, so that guardian ad litem could be appointed if needed); See also McBride v. DeRobertis, No. 84 c 1453, 1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9589 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1988) (guardian ad
litem moved to dismiss action voluntarily without prejudice and simultaneously moved
for reinstatement in order to protect plaintiff's ability to reinstate if he regained competence to prosecute action; court later ruled that appointment of new counsel and reinstatement would be considered only if plaintiff made showing of restored mental competence). But see Burke v. Coughlin, No. 86-cv-1147E, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7880
(W.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (denying appointment of guardian ad litem as futile, but tolling
filing period for motion for new trial or notice of appeal for 30 days).
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matters, were being displayed in numerous films and
television programs, causing psychological, emotional,
and personal injury to plaintiff and her family. Upon order of the court to plead more specific facts, the plaintiff
filed an amended complaint which alleged that every
film and television program shown in the past year depicted her life and secret thoughts and held her up to
ridicule.
0
0 --....

D.

"Improbable"FactualAllegations

1. The Challenge Posed by Improbable Factual Allegations
The handling of improbable factual allegations perhaps poses a
greater challenge to the federal courts than the handling of incredible
allegations. First, the very improbability of particular allegations will
often make them difficult to distinguish from wholly incredible allegations. Although common sense, knowledge of the litigants, past experience, and research are the proper basis for a frivolousness determination,
the judge's visceral reaction may be to immediately reject questionable
allegations.236 However, that visceral reaction must be tempered by the
liberal pleading requirement for pro se pleadings; where there is uncertainty, the court should either allow the action to proceed or, in more extreme circumstances, request additional information concerning the
questionable allegations.

236. See Hidalgo-Disla v. INS, 52 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Our procedure
for ascertaining frivolousness is not visceral; it entails some consideration of each claim
and, where justified, research and analysis.").
237. "[W]hen a question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised, either by a
party or by the court on its own motion, the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise,
into the facts as they exist." Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) (citations
omitted), limited on other grounds by Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646-47 & n.6
(1962); accordMcNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 184 (1936)
("The trial court is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, but may, of its own motion,
if led to believe that its jurisdiction is not properly invoked, 'inquire into the facts as they
really exist."') (quoting Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 120 (1898)); Department of
Recreation & Sports v. World Boxing Ass'n, 942 F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Second, even if particular allegations are recognized as merely improbable and not wholly incredible, the temptation will be to treat them
the same since the improbable allegations will rightfully be regarded as
unlikely to yield any judicial relief. Judges faced with improbable allegations are faced with the unenviable task of pushing the case forward
until the unlikelihood of the plaintiff prevailing becomes a legal certainty
through motion practice or trial. In such instances, the only recourse is
for judges, and other parties, to keep in mind all of the procedural
mechanisms for advancing the day of reckoning. The PLRA provides
one such mechanism by permitting courts to dismiss actions, at their inception, for failure to state a claim and not solely on grounds of frivolousness. 238
Scenarios 4 and 5 illustrate the difficult judgment calls required of a
judge when faced with questionable factual allegations. In scenario 4,
the mere involvement of Queen Elizabeth in the traffic altercation was
highly improbable, but still possible. However, the additional allegations
that the Queen's involvement was through mental telepathy and that
"good ghosts" brought the plaintiff back to life would allow a judge to
safely conclude that all of the allegations concerning the Queen crossed
the line between improbable and wholly incredible.
The allegation in scenario 5 that portions of the plaintiffs personal
life were being displayed in films and television programs was not, by
itself, incredible. It is possible that the plaintiff, or an event in the plaintiff's life, was in some way newsworthy or otherwise of public interest.
However, it is also possible that such an allegation, in light of other facts
known to the court or because the allegation is overly conclusory, might
lead the court to seek additional information. In scenario 5, the additional information provided in the amended complaint made clear that
the allegation was incredible: the plaintiff expanded the suspect allegation to claim that every film and television program shown in the past
year depicted her life and secret thoughts.

238. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
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2. The Cumulative Effect of Multiple Improbable Allegations; Conspiracy Allegations
As previously noted (and illustrated by several of the scenarios),
questionable allegations which, individually, are only merely improbable
may be found wholly incredible when considered together. Many conspiracy allegations fit this pattern: an unlikely conspiracy will become
even less likely, and eventually wholly incredible, as the alleged conspiracy broadens to involve greater numbers of conspirators and fartherranging objectives and acts in support of the conspiracy. But care must
be taken to ensure that valid claims are not dismissed as a result of an
unstable plaintiffs inability to confine his or her pleadings to credible
allegations.
The Denton actions amply illustrate the difficulty in defining the
border between improbable and incredible when a claim, or series of
claims, involves multiple improbable allegations. The judges who considered the Denton rape claims frivolous focused exclusively on the cumulative effect of the allegations, the repetitiveness of which rendered
them questionable, and Hernandez's psychological diagnosis, while ignoring or unnecessarily down-playing the following countervailing factors:
1. Rapes do occur in prison and in psychiatric hospitals;
2. Certain prisoners may be the victims of multiple
rapes because of particular physical or psychological
traits that make them targets of sexual interest by
other prisoners or guards;
3.

Hernandez was, in fact, forcibly drugged by prison
officials, albeit pursuant to the instructions of medical personnel; 239 and

239. See Hernandez v. Ylst, 85-cv-0084 (E.D. Cal.), Findings & Recommendations filed September 8, 1993, at 4-5, 6; Hernandez v. Denton, 83-cv-1348 (E.D. Cal.),
Findings & Recommendations filed September 9, 1993, at 5, 6; Hernandez v. Denton, 83cv-0645 (E.D. Cal.), Findings & Recommendations filed September 9, 1993, at 4, 5.
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4. Certain of the rape allegations were supported by the
affidavits of two other prisoners.24 °
The fourth factor, by itself, should have made a finding of factual
frivolousness impossible. However, even in the absence of the two affidavits, the rape claims should not have been dismissed outright. While
suspiciously repetitive, there remained the possibility that one or more of
the alleged rapes did in fact occur. Hemandez's mental illness may have
caused him to supplement or repeat allegations concerning a rape that
actually occurred rather than invent the entire series of rapes.
In sum, although multiple improbable allegations may be found
wholly incredible when considered together, judges making a frivolousness determination should also consider: (a) whether discrete nonfrivolous factual allegations are separable from the remaining, questionable
allegations, and (b) whether the procedural tools discussed earlier can be
employed to allow claims based on those nonfrivolous allegations to go
forward.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this article will be of some aid in resolving issues relating to the screening of cases under § 1915(e)(2), § 1915A, § 1997e(c),
and the inherent authority of the courts. The article should not be construed as advocating that either a greater or lesser number of questionable claims be dismissed. It merely suggests a framework for making the
close examination such claims require.

Copies of the preceding documents are on file with the New York Law School Lav Review.
240. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 28-29 (discussing and quoting two affidavits). One of the affidavits appears to have been filed as an exhibit in one of Hemandez's actions; the other was attached to an amended complaint which Hemandez attempted to file. See id.

